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THE MYTH OF COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE
DOCTRINE AS A PROTECTOR OF FREE SPEECH
Lee Ann W. Lockridget
Abstract
This article debunks the myth that the fair use doctrine exists to
protect the freedom of speech within copyright. Using the history of
fair use in the courts and in Congress, as well as recent case law, the
Article demonstrates that.fair use is not, and never has been, intended
or designed to restrain copyright in the face of the First Amendment.
The conflict between copyright and free speech could be lessened by
reforming the balance of interests within fair use to eliminate the
focus on commercial use and to expand the understanding of the
broader public-benefit purpose underlying the Supreme

Court's

analysis of transformative uses. This broadening of what constitutes a
"fair" purpose and character of a use would create an opportunity
for judicial balancing of the interests promoted by both copyright and
the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court stated in Eldred

v.

Ashcroft

that copyright

stands apart from most speech restrictions with respect to

First

Amendment scrutiny due, in part, to copyright's promotion of speech
'
through the creation and publication of expression. The Supreme
Court has also told us on more than one occasion that copyright
includes built-in safeguards protecting the First Amendment freedom
of expression, namely the fair use defense and the distinction between
2
idea and expression. We are told that these two accommodations arc
"generally adequate to address" First Amendment concerns, although
they do not go so far as to make copyright "categorically immune"
3
from a First Amendment challenge:
"[W]hen, as in this case,
Congress has

not

altered the

traditional

con tours of

copyright

protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. "4 As
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Eldred, the Court in that
5
sentence provides questions, not answers. What are the "traditional
contours"

of

copyright,

and

have

they

been

altered?

If

the

interpretation of the First Amendment matures in some way, should
that not rightfully reopen the question of the interaction between
copyright and free speech? And to the extent that the "traditional
contours" of copyright have changed, will the Court actually be
willing to scrutinize the relationship of copyright and free speech?
In this article,
safeguard

of

the

I

focus upon the fair use defense as an asserted

freedom

of

speech

guaranteed

by

the

First

Amendment, leaving to one side the idea-expression dichotomy, the

I.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row. Publishers.

Inc. v.Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)) .

.

2.

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221; Hmper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.See also Nihon Keizai

S 1mbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We have repeatedly
.
rejected Ftrst Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground

�

that First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use d octrine.").
3.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.

4.

Id

5.

As stated by Justice Breyer:

':!e

cannot avoid the need to examine the statute
carefully by saying that
.
ot altered the trad1t1onal contour s of copyright protectio
n," for
the senten e P mts to the question, rather than
the answer. Nor should we avoid
that ex mmat10n here. That degree of judicia
l vigilance-at the far outer
boundanes of t e Clause-is warranted if we
are to avoid the monopolies and
consequent restnct 1ons of expression that the
Clause , read consistently with the
First Amendment, seeks to preclude.

�
?

Congress has

�

�

�

Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Following a brief survey of

some basic principles underlying copyright and First Amendment
protection and the manner in which the First Amendment can restrain
copyright, I explore the question of whether the fair use doctrine was
intended or designed to perform that function of restraint. The answer
to that question is no. Despite the Court's assertion that the fair use
doctrine safeguards the

freedom of speech

within the realm of

copyright, I find that under modem First Amendment jurisprudence
the structure and current interpretation of fair use miss the mark. 7 As

codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine
directs courts to

consider a matter that would be an improper

consideration

any

6.

m

other

First-Amendment-sensitive

analysis,

Other scholars have begun the critique of relying heavily on the modem distinction

between ideas and expression to protect First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel,

locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. I, 13-20 (2001);

Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and

Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 E MOR Y L.J. 393, 394-95 ( 1989). Further

exploration of the topic in a manner parallel to the thesis I advance here would appropriately be
the subject for an entirely separate article.
I also leave to one side the important debate on the sufficiency of modem fair use's
performance of its internal copyright duty of maintaining an appropriate balance between new
creativity and existing creativity mindful of copyright's Constitutional goal of promoting the
public interest through encouraging the production of new creative works. Similarly, I do not
discuss the arguable economic role of fair use as a means of addressing market failure. See, e.g.,
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). Instead, I limit my

discussion and analysis here to the interaction of fair use with the First Amendment.

The work of many scholars enables me to move quickly through the initial question
of the interaction of copyright with the First Amendment and to focus instead on the specific
question of fair use. Among those scholars and their relevant works are: Paul Goldstein,

Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); David McGowan, Why the

First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT . L. REV. 281 (2004); Netanel,

supra; Melville 8. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?,
Imagination:

I 7 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Jed Rubenfeld,

Copyright's

Constitutionality,

I 12 YALE L.J.

I

(2002);

The Freedom of

Rebecca

Tushnet,

Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright has in Common with Anti
Pornography laws. Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 8.C.

L. REV. I (2000); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids
With What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property:

Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697 (2003);

Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L.

REV. 673 (2003). This is by no means an all-inclusive list.
7.

In this article I apply the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence governing the

interpretation of the First Amendment and its application to speech restrictions. I do not herein

endorse that interpretation, nor do I purport to provide my own normative vision of the First
Amendment.

[Vol .
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namely the profit-making purpose o f an al legedly infringing usc.x In

addition, a lthough the Court's approach to fair use in Camphell v.
Acuff Rose Music, Inc. 9 shifted the fair use emphasis away from the
commerciality of a use, its
diminishes
recognizing

the
a

potential
free

new focus,

for

speech

the

first

interest

transfonnativc use,
factor

within a

to

be

fair

also

uti Iized

us e

in

defense.

Transformation, as contrasted with reproduction or distribution

or

another non-transformative use of a work, does not hold any greater
inherent First Amendment value.
The Supreme Court and lower courts could acknow ledge that
fair use does not function as a protector of free speech and instead
institute separate First Amendment review in appropriate cases. In
light of Eldred, that seems highly unlikely. 1 0 As a res ult, further
attention to the fair use doctrine is needed. Enabling the fair use
doctrine to perform its assigned First A mendment role w o u l d require
reform. Specifically, I argue that fair use should not foc us o n the
commerciality of a defendant's use in the context o f p urpose and
character of a use. As such, I recommend that Congress m odify the
statutory text so as to redirect the attention of the courts away from
profit motive. Similarly, the courts shoul d not myopical ly view fair
use as limited to transformative use. A wider range of uses should be

understood to serve the public interests vindicated throug h both the
First Amendment and copyright, and Campbell itse l f i m p l icates a
wider range of uses when it is read broadly rather than narrowly.

These changes wil l not eliminate the conflict between copyright and

the First Amendment; nothing ever wil l . I nstead, such c hanges create
a real opportunity for judicial balancing of interests s o that both
copyright and free speech interests can be more fully c onsidered
within fair use.

8 · 17 u.s.c § 10? (2000) provides: "In determining
whether the use made of a work in
.
_. a fair
any particular case 1s
use the factors to be consid ered shall
. and
include_ ( 1) t_h e purpose
character of the use, including whether such
. I nature
use is of a commercia
or 1s for nonprofit
educational purposes."
v: Acuff-Rose Music,

9.

Campbell

10.

The Court

Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 583-85 (
1994)

.
Eldred was comfortable asserti
:
. .
.
ng th at the idea-expression
d1stmction
and the fair use defense are "general!Ya
dequate to address" F.irst A
.
men dment concerns, without
.
any real support, demonstrating a lack
.
of intere.
st m further scrutinizin
g this issue. See Eldred,
537 U . S. at 221.
m
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II. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Copyright's Constitutional Basis
Copyright

grants

to authors and

their successors-in-interest
11
certain exclusive rights in original expression. The scope of federal
copyright law has grown over the more than 200 years since the first
federal copyright law took effect in 1790.12 For example, the first
federal copyright law protected maps, charts, and books against
unauthorized printing, reprinting, publishing, vending, and importing.
13
It provided a fourteen-year term of protection, with one possible
14
renewal term.
The 1976 Copyright Act, which remains in effect
today with amendments, protects all "original works of authorship
15
fixed in a tangible medium of expression"
from unauthorized
reproduction, distribution, public performance, and public display,
and provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right to create
16
The current term

derivative works based on the copyrighted work.

of protection is the life of the author plus seventy years thereafter, or
17
for works for hire, ninety-five years from publication.
Congress's authority to enact federal copyright laws arises from
an express power in Article I of the Constitution: "The Congress shall
have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
18
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The utilitarian
philosophical rationale of both our patent and copyright law finds
voice in the preambular language "to promote the progress of science

11.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-106A (2000).

12.

Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, I Stat. 124 ( 1790).

13.

Id.§§ 1-2.

14.

Id. § 2. An 1802 revision added prints to the subject matter protected by copyright,

Copyright Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 ( 1802), and an 1831 revision added musical
compositions and extended the initial term to 28 years, Act of February 3, 1831, chap. 16, 4 Stat.
436 ( 1831). The 1870 Copyright Revision Act, which continued the 1790 Act's separate
recitation of rights from the list of infringing acts for the first time associated the right to copy
with books, but its infringement section did not include the right to copy with respect to books.

See Act of July 8, 1870, chap. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217, §§ 86, 99-100 (1870). The 1909 Copyright

Act protected "all of the writings of an author" and protected all such works from unauthorized

printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat.
1075 (1909). For further discussion of the expansion of U.S. copyright via statutory revision, see

L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. I, 40-44 (1987).
15.

17U.S.C.§ 102(a).

16.

17 u.s.c. § 106.

17.

17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). For works for hire, the term is either 95 years from first

publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter.
18.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Copyright Clause).

36
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and useful arts." In using this language, the Foun d e rs appear to have
justified the grant of a limited monopoly in the writings of authors
and the discoveries of inventors by re fe rring to the greater public
good presumed to arise from that monopoly - spcci fi ca lly , the
9
"progress o f science and useful arts." 1 In particular. the utilitarian
link exists in the presumption that if the law provides fix exclusive
rights in writings and discoveries, then the authors and inventors of
those writings and discoveries will have greater motivation to w rite
and discover than they would otherwise have. Under this theory, with

greater m otivation more writing and in venting will occur, and this
greater productivity will benefit the public through
science and useful arts.

progress

20

in

The utilitarian basis for U.S. copyright law underlies, to n o small
extent, the distinction between ideas and expression as well as the fair
use doctrine.

The

1976 Copyright Act expressly prov ides

for a

distinction to be made between protected expression and the ideas
therein, and it excludes ideas from any copyright
21
protection. While facts are not specifical l y covered b y the statutory
embodied

language, the 1991 case of Feist Pubhcations Inc. v. Rural Telephone
22
made it abundantl y clear that facts emb o died within
Service Co.
copyright-protected expression are treated the same as ideas: they are
from

excluded

copyright

protection.

This

distinction

protected expression and unprotected ideas and

facts

between

(the "idea

expression d ichotomy" or the "idea-expression distinction") provides
a general limitation on the scope o f copyright protection in a given

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.. 464 U.S. 417. 429. 477
19.
(1984); Harper& R w, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 4 7 1 U . S 539 546 (1985): Wendy J
.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Ments of Copyright: The Challenges o/Consistenci-. Consent. and

.

�

,

Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1437-39 ( 1989).

·

'.

20. Th s utilitarian basis for copyright, while not absolutely controlling of U.S. copyright
law and policy, has affected the law in this country. See genera/�1, PAUL GOLDSTE�:-.1.
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE* I (200 I). The effect
can be
seen � hen our laws are compar� d to the copyright laws of countries asserting a foundation in
author s nghts, a more natural nghts-based conception. Id. A notable d.1vergence between our
..
system and those systems trad11ionally based in an author's rights philosophy is the absence in
.
the U.S. of a broad, express collechon
of moral rights in works of authorsh·1p. S ee generaIIy
.
John H Merryman, The ReJ,r.
ngerator of Bernard Buffet, 2 7 HASTINGS L.J. I 023
( 1976) The
:
or I right of the author provide, in general terms, the right of attributio
n (or non-attrib tion)
o t e �or to the aut or and the right of integrity of the work,
as well as the right of
_
d1vulgat
1on. In some nations, such as France and Italy the moraI ·
nghts secured to the author
'
un der th e Iaw are perpetual and largely inalienable. See id. at
I 044.
.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § I 02(b) (2000). While the distinc
tion between ideas and expressi.on
.
first appeared in the statute in 1976, the d'ISt.mct1on
was not new to copynght 1 aw. See, e.g.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 , 217 (1954).
22. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 344

��

�

�

�

·

(1991 )

.
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work of authorship, which means it is also c ritical to a second
author' s ability to use copyright-protected works in creating new
works. By ensuring

that the ideas

and facts contained within

copyright-protec ted expression cannot be monopolized by the author
or other copyright owner, copyright law maintains those ideas and
facts as the building blocks available to new works of authorship. In
doing so, copyright law does not allow c opyri ght protec tion to
discourage further use of those ideas and facts. This lack of protection
contributes to progress in the arts and sciences, which is thought to
benefi t the greater public interest.
A second general limitation on the rights granted to a c opyright
23
owner under U.S. law is the fair use doctrine. The 1976 Act c odified
24
fair use in sec tion 107,
although the c oncept was not new to U.S.
25
law. In general terms, as stated in an older treatise on copyright and
later endorsed by the Supreme Court, fair use is "a privilege in others
than the owner of a c opyright to use the c opyrighted material in a
26
manner
without
his
consent."
That
general

reasonable

charac terization, while helpful, no longer controls the scope of the
doctrine. Part IV .A. of this article sets forth the details of the c urrent
doc trine of fair use.

23.

Additional, more specific limitations on a copyright owner's rights may be found

elsewhere in U.S. copyright law, including the first sale doctrine of§

I 09 and the various

exceptions to the public performance and display rights found in§ 110. See 17 U.S.C.§§ 109110 (2000).
24.

Section I 07 of the Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections I 06 and I 06A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include -

(I ) the

purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of

a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
I 7 U .S.C. § I 07 (2000).
25.

See

26.

HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), quoted

infra Part 111.A-D.

in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U . S . 539, 549 (1985).

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
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The connection of fair use to the utilitarian basis o f copyright
exists in the understanding that little in this world, inc luding the
27
All works find

creative world o f authorship, is completely new.

some antecedent in an earlier creative work, whether the author
consciously understands that antecedent basis or the connection is
instead subconscious. By opening the extent to which a new work of
authorship may draw from older works, to include not only unlimited
uses of works no longer protected by copyright but also limited uses
of preexisting works still protected by copyright, fair use expands
28
ln so doing, fair use can
creative possibilities for new authorship.
encourage authors to take advantage of those creative possibili ties,
which in tum supports copyright's Constitutional goal o f promoting
progress in the arts and sciences for the benefit of the public .
Under our law, copyright's primary goal is to protect the interest
of the public in encouraging progress in literature, arts, science, and
9
other cultural and intel lectual pursuits. 2 Private benefit to an author is
the vehicle by which copyright promotes that public interest. The
idea-expression distinction and the fair use doctrine, two means by
which a second author or other user of a work may re-utilize material
from a copyright-protected work, are exceptions to the copyright
monopoly that also promote the same public interest. Moreover, in

Eldred the Court tied the idea-expression distinction and the fair use

doctrine to the public interest promoted by the First Amendment. 30 So

See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc . , 510 U.S. 569. 575 (l 994) ("[A]s
27.
Justice Story explained, '[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few,
if any, t hings, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout,'" (quoting

�merson

v.

Davies, 8 F.Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)), and "[There is an]
_
m the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others
to build upon it [as noted by Lord Ellenborough] when he wrote, 'while I shall think myself

inherent

tension

bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon
science."' (quoting Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.8. 1803))).

28. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Propertv and the
.
Rest1tut10nary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 157-58 ( 1992).
·

29.
See, e.g. , Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429, 477
(1984); Harper & Row, 471 U.S.at 546.
30.

Eldred v.Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003):

[C]opyright's

expression . . . .

purpose is to promote the

creation

and publication

of free

In addition to spurring the creation and publica
tion of new expression
.
cop ng t law conta1_ s built-in First Amend
ment accommodations. First,
d1stm u1shes be�een ideas and expression and
makes only the latter eligible for
copynght protection ....

�

�

�

�

j;

�

Second, he "fair use " defense allows the public
to use not only facts and ideas
m
a copyrighted work , b ut a lso expres
sion itself in certain
circumstances.

contained

·
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the

Court

in

Eldred

gave

Congress

wide

latitude

39
in

implementing copyright protection under its Copyright Clause power,
it also elevated

to constitutional importance the idea-expression

distinction and the fair use doctrine by relying on both the copyright

power and the First Amendment.31 In so doing, it acknowledged that a
broad public interest underlies both doctrines - a public interest
invested with concerns related to both "progress in science and the
useful arts" and the freedom of speech under the F irst Amendment.32
B. Current First Amendment Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble,

and

to

petition

the

Government

for

a

redress

of

grievances."33 The development of First Amendment free speech and
free press jurisprudence34 has moved beyond the raw text, which
provides simply that "Congress shall make no law .

.

.

abridging the

freedom of speech, or of the press."35 Despite Justice Black's rhetoric
emphasizing the bright-line nature of that language,36 Congress and
the several states have passed numerous laws that restrain speech and
yet manage to coexist with the First Amendment. We have laws
restricting defamatory speech known to be false,37 speech disclosing
another 's trade secret,38 speech concerning particular ongoing judicial

(citations omitted).
31.
32.

Id.

Id.

at 219-21.

33. U. S.CONST. amend.I.
34. Throughout the article I generally refer only to free speech when referring to the
relevant right protected by the First Amendment. In almost all instances, the same concern
would apply to the freedom of the press when "the press" is the copyright defendant.
35.

U.S. CONST.

36.

See. e.g.,

amend. I ( emphasis added).
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring):

Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for inference that
abridgments of speech and press can be made just because they are slight. That
Amendment provides, in simple words, that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." I read "no law ... abridging"
to mean no law abridging.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Beauhamais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 ( 1952).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000) (federal statute proscribing and providing for
criminal punishment of the theft of a trade secret, including theft accomplished via disclosure of
the trade secret); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985) (uniform act adopted by
more than 40 states, wherein civil l i ability may be imposed for the disclosure of a trade secret).
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mental
and more. Thus it is clear that not all govern
matters,
the protected
restrictions on communications imperm issibly abridge
freedom of speech and press.

40

First Amendment schola rship traces two domin ant
g the
purposes for the protection of freedom of speech: ensurin
our
rding
individual freedom of self-expression and safegua
of
democratic form of government by providing for freedom
41
Neither theory can perfectly
communication amongst the citizenry.
Modem

explain all the speech freedoms the Court has guarded over the years;
42
each appears to be playing a role. The Court has attempted to divine
0
the extent of the amendment's reach by applying these purposes."
The self-realization theory holds that individuals need to be able
to express themselves freely in order t o fully imagine and reach their
44
Authors need freedom in order to express their own
full potential.

See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1 985) (upholding th.:

39.

constitutionality of a criminal obstruction-of-justice statute as applied to a defendant who
improperly disclosed federal grand jury information).
At least this is true under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. Even Justice Black

40.

voted to uphold certain restraints on speech, despite the absolutist position he set forth in Smith
v.

California. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 ( 1969)

(Black, J., dissenting):
While 1 have always believed that under the Fi rst and Fourteenth Amendments
neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or
censor the content of speech, 1 have never believed that any person has a right to
give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he
pleases.
See also Cohen v. Cali fornia, 403 U.S. 1 5, 27 ( 197 1 ) (Justice Black joining Justice 8 lackmun 's

dissent from the Court's ruling that Cohen's First Amendment rights were implicated. which
dissent characterized Cohen's use of the statement "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket as "mainly
conduct, and little speech."); supra note 36.
See, e.g., DANIEL A . FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2d ed. 2003); ZECHARIAH

41.

CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3 3 ( 1 941):

The First Amendment protects two kinds of i nterests in free speech. There i s
an individual i nterest, the need of many men to express their opinions o n matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment o f
truth, so that the country may not only adopt t h e wisest course of action but cany
it out in the wisest way.
See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND IT S RELATION TO SELF-GOVER NMENT
63, 88-89 (1948) (maintaining that the only purpose of the First Amendment's freedom of

?rotection of public discussion in support of our structure of self-government, but
�otmg that this sole purpose supporting the public need includes other narrower interests within

speech is the

ti).
42.

See FARBER, supra note 41, at 3-8.

43.

See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Counci l ' Inc. 4 2 5
'
U.S. 748, 761-65 ( 1 976).

44.

See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 3 5 7 ( 1927).
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v1s10n, which

in

turn

can benefit the public through cultural
of individual expression also underlies an
individual search for truth. By being free to express any idea,
enrichment. Freedom

individuals are encouraged to contribute to the " marketplace of ideas"
from which individuals and society may choose in the search for
45
truth.
The " marketplace of ideas" premise underlies both the

individual self-expression purpose as well as the col lective public
discourse purpose. Under the collective public discourse purpose,

First Amendment protections do not aim to p rotect individual self
realization. Instead, First Amendment protections exist to protect our

system of democracy by ensuring that public decisionmaking is
informed to the fullest extent possible.4 6 Speech restrictions should
not be erected within the area of public discourse, as that speech has

"constitutional value because [it] is regarded as constituting
participation in the process of democratic self-govemance."47
With the purposes of First Amendment protection operating
largely, although not completely, as a subtext, two questions in
particular resurface throughout the Court's jurisprudence: (1) what
sort of communication constitutes the protected " speech" or " press,"

(2) what does it mean to impermissibly "abridge" a freedom.

and

Answers

to

those

questions

help

guide

the

assessment

of

the

constitutiona lity of a law's impact on communicative freedom.

[The Founders] believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty.
Id. at

375 (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)

(holding unconstitutional the criminal punishment of mere advocacy of lawless action that is not
likely to incite the action, and overruling Whitney in doing so, but not disputing Brandeis's
discussion of the purpose of the First Amendment). See also Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1188.

45.

See Virginia v. Hicks,

539 U.S. 113, 119 (2 003) (noting that an overbroad law

restricting speech may cause persons to "abstain from protected speech - harming not only
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.").

46. See, e.g. , Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 ( l 995) (tying First
Amendment freedoms to well-informed public discourse):
Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of public discourse
has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the
topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that
problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one.
See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,

485 U.S. 46, 55 ( 1988) (relying on criticism's value
41, at
88-89, 94; Robert Post, The Con stitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. I, 4
(2000).
to public discourse in protecting Hustler Magazine's speech); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note

47.

Post, supra note

46, at 4.
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1. Communications Protected as " Speech"
Modem

free

speech

jurisprudence

depends

largely

on

categorization of both the communication or activity affected by a
49
48
restriction
and the nature of the restriction. Categorization of the
communication ostensibly helps answer the question of wheth cr it is
_
"speech" that falls fully within the protected freedom, �0 and
categorization of the speech restriction determines what type of
51
review a court will apply. After categorization of the speech and the
restriction, the court assesses the interest promoted by the restriction
and the necessary fit between the speech restriction and the interest
52
being promoted. This assessment operates largely as a balancing of
interests

in

an

constitutionally
53
speech.
The

major

effort
or

to

determine

unconstitutionally

speech

categories

whether
a bridges

addressed

the
the

by

restriction
freedom

modern

of

First

Amendment jurisprudence, including both protected and unprotected
speech categories, are obscenity, incitemen t and fighting words, false

48. See, e. g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 ( 1 983) (analyzing
whether a pamphlet was fully protected speech or instead commerc ial speech entitled to
qualified First Amendment protection); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v . Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (setting forth an analysis for a restriction on commercial
speech that provides qualified First Amendment protection to commercial speech); A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen., 383 U . S. 413, 418
( 1 966) (providing a three-part test that may be used to categorize sexual speech as either
unprotected obscenity or protected speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 4 76. 485 (1957)
(holding that obscenity, although it is a form of speech, is not protected speech under the First
Amendment because it has no redeeming social value).
49. Compare Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (detailing the
three-part analysis for a content-neutral time, place, or manner speech restriction). with Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 329 ( 1 988) (providing a two-part test for a content-based restriction).
See also E �in Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of S peech:
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (noting the

Court's reliance on the categorization of speech restrictions into content-based restrictions and
content-neutral restrictions).

50. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 4 1 8 U.S. 405, 4 1 0-11 ( 1 974) (providing an analysis
for when conduct is expressive and is to be protected as speech); A Book Named
..John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman ofPleasure," 383 U.S. at 4 1 8 (providing an analysis
for when
expres s1on 1s protected speech and when it is unprotected obscenity); Roth, 354 U.S.
at 489
(same).
51.
Compare Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 791 (content-neutral speech
restriction), with Boos, 485
U.S. at 321, 329 (content-based speech restriction ).
52. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-803; Boos, 485 U.S. at
32 1 -29· CentraI Hudson, 447
U.S. at 568-71.
'

53. See, e.g., Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 796-803; Boos, 485 U.S.
at 321-39; Central Hudwn, 447
U.S. at 568-7 1 ,. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen
s Consumer Counc il Inc ., 425 U . S .
748, 765-70 ( 1 976).
'
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speech and libel, commercial speech, and, finally, what we might
categorize as core speech, which includes both expressive conduct

and more traditional forms of expression.54 Copyright's fair use
doctrine does not specifically im plicate obscene, fighting, or violence
inciting speech, as the courts have attempted to avoid judging the
fairness of a use based on its emotive content or the artistic "value" of
the allegedly infringing work. 55 Whether speech is libelous does not
affect whether it falls within fair use or the scope of another's
copyright. Copyright and fair use also do not directly implicate any
aspect of expressive conduct that differs from other core speech.56
Accordin gly, my analysis focuses only on core speech, excluding
expressive conduct, and comm ercial speech.

2. Impermissible Abridgment of the Freedom of Speech
Restrictions on fully protected core speech are categorized as
either content-based

restrictions

or

content-neutral restrictions. 57

Content-based restrictions survive First Amendment scrutiny if the
restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest
and the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.58
Content-neutral restrictions, which are often referred to as time, place,
or manner restrictions, must naturally be justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, be narrowly tailored to serve a
54. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cle/and's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 383
U.S. at 418 (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 ( 1 969 ) (incitement and
fighting words); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 4 1 8 U.S. 323, 340 ( 1 974) (false speech); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 3 7 6 U.S. 254, 266-70 (1964) (libel); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 761 -70 (commercial speech); Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10-1 I (expressive conduct); Boos,
485 U.S. at 318 (characterizing protection for political speech and speech on public issues as the
"core ofthe First Amendment").
55. There is a general prohibition on assessing artistic value for purposes of determining
copyright protection. See. e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 10 U.S. 5 69, 582-83
( 1994); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithogr aphing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (I 903). Courts have, however,
implicated value judgments within the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d 1 429, 1 435-36 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
5 10 U.S. 569 (1994).
56. A defendant must be found to have used expression in order for a prima facie case of
infring ement to be made, following which fair use might be analyzed. That use might come in
the form of any of the exclusive rights under section I 06. Regardless of the exclusive right
implicated, copyright infringement claims expressly govern the use of expression. No additional
interpretive link need be made in copyright from conduct to expressive or communicative
purpose or impact. Moreover, even though a defendant's conduct in reproducing, distributing, or
otherwise infringing a work will certainly be part of an infringement claim, copyright law is
certainly not a generally applicable conduct regulation. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 6, at 4345.
57.

See Ward, 49

58.

Boos, 485

1 U.S. at 79 1; Boos,485 U.S. at 3 19-21.

U.S. at 321.
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significant

governmental

interest,

and

must

leave

open

alternative channels for communication of the infonnation . 59

24

ample

The Court c ategorizes commercial speech regulations apart from
core speech regulations, despite the fact that the very category of
0
commercial speech is based in large part on content, 6 and the
governmental purpose for regulating commercial speec h is often
6
content-based. 1 The Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
indicates that it protects commercial speech for purposes unrela ted to
self-expre ssion or self-realization, which in tum sets commercial
speech and its regulation apart from core speech:
It is a matter of public interest that [private economic] decis ions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well in formed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable . And if it is
indispensable to the proper a l location

of resources

in

a free

enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation o f
intelligent opinions as t o how that system ought to be regulated o r
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought t o b e
primari ly a n instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information docs
not serve that goal.

Public
rationale

62

discourse theory

c learly

for inc l uding commercial

resonates
speech

with

within

the
the

Court's
"speech"

protected by the First Amendment. This distinction in purpose behind
the protection for commercial speech has resulted in a difference in
6
the Court' s s crutiny of commercia l speech restrictions. 3 Restrictions
on commercial speech must advance a substantial governmental
6
interest and be c losely tailored to serve that governmental interest. 4

Ward, 49 1 U.S. at 79 1 .
59.
60 . See Bolger v . Youn�s Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U .S. 60, 66-68 ( 1 98 3 ) (identifying
commercial speech m part by its content, namely, reference to a particular product within the
speech).
.

6 1 . See, e.g. , Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc 425
U.S . 748, 749-50 � 66-69 0 976) (noting that the state law under review banned
only ha acist
:
adverttsmg contammg particular content, namel y prescri ption drug prices).

� �

62.

Id. at

63.
64.

See id. at

765 (citations omitted).
77 1 -72.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'
n, 447 U.S. 5 5 7, 564 ( 1 980) :
The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieve
d by restrict ions on
commercial speech. Moreover the regulatory techniq
ue must be in proporft on 1 o
that interest. The limitation on expres sion must be
designed careful ly to ac h 1eve
.
the State s goa1 · Co�pltance with this requirement
may be measured by two
.
.
cntena First, the restnct1on must direct ly advan
ce the state interest involv ed· the
:
.
regulatton may not be sustained if it provides
only ineffective or remote support
fior th e government 's purpose.
Second , t· r t h e governmental interest could
be
•
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Commercial speech that is mis leading or regarding unlawful activity
65
does not gain even this intermediate level of protection.
Even with respec t to nonmis leading c ommercial speech,

a

comparison between the Court's tes ts for c ontent- based and c ontent
neutral speech regulations and the tes t for a commercial speech
regulation

demonstrates

that

commercial

speech receives

less

protection than does c ore speech. The c ommerc ial speech analysis is
close to that for c ontent-neutral c ore speech res tric tions, but because
content can play a role in a commerc ial speech regulation, and
because no alternate-communications-channel analysis is required,
commercial speech s t il l fa lls somewhat below core speech with
66
respect to the scrutiny and protec tion provided. Thus, the dis tinction
between "commerc ial" speech and oth er protec ted speech creates a
zone where gov ernment regulation is presumptively more valid than a
similar regulation

would

be

if it

restricted

core

speech.

The

distinction, of c ourse, r eq u ires that a dividing line be defi ned between
what is "c ommerc ial" speech and what is not.
In its first dec is ion providing explicit protection to commercial
speech,

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy

v.

Virginia

Citizens

served as well by a more l i mited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.
65 .

Id. at 563-64:
[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commerc ial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about l awful activity. The

government may ban fonns of communication more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity. If the
[comme rcial] communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed.
(citations omitted).
66.

The Court summarized the di fferential level of protection for commercial speech and

some of the justifications for t he di fference in 44 Liquormart,
Our opinion [ i n

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy

v.

Inc.

v.

Rhode Island:

Virginia Citizens Consumer

Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1 976)] noted that the greater "objectivity" of
commercial speech justifies affording

the

[government]

more freedom to

distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, and that the greater
"hardiness" of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely
diminishes the chilling e ffect that may attend its regulation.
Subsequent

cases explained that the

[government's] power to regulate

com mercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial
speech that is "linked inextricably" to those transactions . . . Nevertheless, as we
explained in

[Linmark Assocs., Inc.

v.

Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96

(1977)], the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech
restri ctions strike at "the substance of the information communicated" rather than
the "com mercial aspect o f [it] - with offerors communicating o ffers to offerees."
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 1 7 U.S. 484, 499 ( 1 996) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted).
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67
Consumer Council, Inc. ,
the Court began to explore what was and
was not c o m mercial speech. In the course o f exp l a i n i ng why the
speech at issue, p harmacists' advertising o f prescription drug prices,
warranted

First

Amendment

protect i on ,

the

C o u rt

recounted

numerous characteristics that did not rob speech of fu l l protec tion as
core speech:

( I ) the spending of money to

proj ect the speech, as with

a paid advertisement of one sort or the o ther ( for which the Court
cited to political advertising and paid
notices);

p lacement

(2) placing the speech in a form

of protest-type

that is sold for profit (as

with books or movies or religiou s literature); and

(3)

i n c l uding wi th

the speech a solicitation to pay o r c ontribute money (sup ported by the
Court with reference to decisions related to rel igious so l i c itation and
other advocacy g roup fund-raising e ffo rts). 6x In addition, the Court
rejected the idea that the commercial c ontent of speech (for example,
discussing the regulation of prices by the government or commenting
upon the stock m arket) causes speech to relinquish full Const itut ional
.

protection.

69

According to the Court, the question before it was "whether
speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'
is so removed from any 'exposition o f ideas ' and from ' truth, science,

morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on
the administration of Government ' that it lacks all protec tion . "70 The
Court answered that question in the negative: even "speech which

does no more than propose a commercial transaction" c ontributes to
enlightened public decisionmaking and is thus protected.7 1 The Court
did not provide any further exposition o f the distinction between

commercial speech and core speech othe r than to assert t hat there are
"commonsens e d 1" f�
ierences" between t h e two. 7J- As such, Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy provided only an initial d efinition of
commercial speech as "speech which does no more than propose a
.
. n. "73 Th
commerc1a1 transactio
e l ater case of Bolger v. You ngs Drug
67.
( 1 976).
68.
69.

Va. State Bd. of Phannacy v. Va. C itizens Consumer Counc i l , I
n c . . 425 U . S . 748
Jd. at 76 l .

Id. at 76 1 -62.

70. Id. at 762 (quoting Pit�sburgh Press Co. v. P ittsburg
h Comm'n on Human Relations.
4 1 3 .S. 376, 3 8 5 ( 1 973), Chaplmsky v. New Hamps hire,
3 1 5 U.S. 568, 5 72 ( 1 942) and Roth
v. Umted States, 3 5 4 U . S . 476, 484 ( 1 957)).

�

•

71.

See Va. State Bd.

72.

ld. at 7 7 1 n.24.

ofPharmacy, 425 U.S.at 762-6 5.

73 . Id. at 762. The impact of the distin ction
upon the degree of protec tion for s peech did
_
_
. e signifi
_
not receiv
cant attention m the decision . The Co rt
u on I y prov1·d ed that w h i l e comme rcial
speech was not excluded from First Amendment
protec tion, greater regulation of commercial
.
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Products Co rp. 74 reinforced the differential protection of core and
commercial speech and also somewhat broadened the definition of
75
Under Bolger, even when speech does more
commercial speech.
than propose a commercial transaction, a combination of elements can
identify that speech

as

commercial,

rather

than core,

speech:

presentation in an advertising form, reference to a specific product,
7
and a speaker's economic motivation. 6 Absent these characteristics,
speech related to commerce will be treated as core speech.
Although the Court is in fact approaching a point where non
misleading

commercial

speech

is

provided

protection roughly
77
equivalent to the protection provided to core speech,
it has not
reached that point and does not appear likely to do so in the near
future. The line-drawing between commercial and noncommercial
speech remains important. The Court has c learly indicated that core
speech should retain full First Amendment protection - and that few
lines may be drawn within core speech. As such, it would seem
crucial that the line between commercial speech and core speech be
drawn so that we do not mistakenly under-protect core speech by
78
erroneously identifying it as commercial speech.

speech would be tolerated (as compared to core speech regu lation) so that "the flow of truthful
and legitimate commerc ial information is unimpaired." Id. at 7 7 1 n.24.
74.

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 ( 1 983) .

In Bolger, the defendant had distributed pamphlets discussing venereal diseases.
Some of the pamphlets discussed venereal disease and condom use at length and included the
defendant's name and identified its condom brand only at the bottom of the last page of the
eight-page pamphlet. Id. at 62 n.4. These pamphlets could not be characterized merely as
proposals to engage in commercial transactions, but the Court still classified them as
commercial speech . Id. at 66-68. They were so classified because they (a) were conceded to be
advertisements dissem inated in return for payment of money, (b) referenced a specific product,
and (c) were mailed with an economic motive. Id. at 66-67. According to the Court, although
one of those characteristics alone would not support a determination that the pamphlets were
commercial speech, the combination of all of those characteri stics supported the classification.
Id. at 67.
75.

76.
77.

Id.

Accord Volokh, supra note 6, at 738.

78. Cf Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who 's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627 ( 1 990). Kozinski and Banner criticize the commercial speech doctrine, including the
vagu e and malleable definition of commercial speech, noting:
[T)he commercial speech doctrine, like all other shortcuts in the law, is not cost
free. It gives government a powerful weapon to suppress or control speech by
classify ing it as merely commercial. If you think carefully enough, you can find a
commercial aspect to almost any first amendment case. Today's protected
expression may become tomorrow's commercial speech.
Id. at 653 .
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C. The Intersection of Copyright and the First Amendment
1 . Copyright's Abridgment of the Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment provides, i n relevant part: "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or o f the press. "79
Copyright law abridges an absolute freedom of speech because it
xo
As a
limits an individual ' s ability to use pre-existing expression.
result, it also limits somewhat an individual 's ab ility

to convey

information to others. Copyright abridges speech by pro v iding the
copyright owner a right of action against another's use of expression
when that expression is substantially

simi lar to

the

expression

contained within a work in which that owner holds exc l u s i ve rights.
By purposely contro l ling the use of c e rtain expression, copyright law
creates a restriction on the freedom o f speech.
That

copyright

law

restricts

81

speech,

and

that

the

First

Amendment genera l ly prohibits such laws, does not mean c opyright
and the First Amendment cannot coexist. As set forth above, the First
Amendment has not been interpreted by the Court to proh ibit all
restrictions on speech. Some restrictions survive judicial s c rutiny via
a balancing of interests, and copyright itself is supported by valid
public and private i nterests. Thus we may safely concl ude that some
amount of speech restriction via c o pyright may well be tolerable
under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, not all restriction o f speech
via copyright must be tolerated.
Given that U . S . copyright law p ro v i des for a private c i v i l right of
action on the part of a copyright owner, rather than direct
82
one might question whether C ongress,
governmental regulation,
through copyright, has actually abridged any freedom. T h i s question
should not detain one long. The F irst Amendment not only restricts
direct governmental interference and regulation by C ongress - such
as would arise with an explicit restriction on speech taking p l ace on

79. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80. See 1 7 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2000).
81.

Accord

_Step�en . M. McJohn, Eldred's Afiermath: Tradition, the Copyright Clame.
10 MICH. T ELECOMM. & TECH L REV 95 100
(2003) ("Copyright, by its nature, restricts expressi on."). Cf N.Y.
Times C�. v: Unit�d s'tates.
403 u .s. 713, 7�6
(1971) (Brennan , J. concurri ng) (implying, purely in dictum. that because
_
copynght restrains only expression, leaving ideas free for use, it does not generally create a
.
restnction
on speech).
� 2. See � 7 U.�.C. §§ 106, 50 1 (200 0 ) . The Copyright Act also includes criminal
provisions, but �n �ndmg a conflict between copyright and the First Amendment I do not look
. ty of criminal
only to the poss1b1h
sanction.

and the Const1tutzonahzat10n of Fair Use,
n. *
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federal property

- but

it

also

concerns,

and can

restrict,

49

the

availability under state or federal law of c i v i l actions by private
83
For example, the private nature of a copyright

individuals.

infringement

claim

may

be

compared

to

a

private

claim

of

defamation, such as the claim made almost fifty years ago by one Mr.
Sullivan

regardi ng

the

allegedly

l i belous nature of a paid
advertisement in the New York Times. 84 The state's provision of a
civil action against the Times and certain persons associated with
placement of the adverti sement, and the actual use of the action by
Sullivan in a manner alleged to restrain the First Amendment rights of
the defendants, was sufficient, accordi n g to the S upreme Court, to
bring the state l aw within the realm subject to First Amendment
85
scrutiny.
Like state defamation laws, copyright laws are speech
restrictions enforced through private rights of action. As such, I find
no difficulty whatsoever in asserting that copyright laws must pass
First Amendment scrutiny even though copyright provides for private
rights of action rather than direct governmental intervention and
control.

2.

Analyzing the Competing Constitutional Interests of
C opyright and Speech

Both copyright protection and the freedom of speech arise from
the U.S. Constitution, one from an express power granted to Congress
in the Copyright Clause and the other from the F i rst Amendment. The
relationship of federal copyright to the guarantee of freedom o f
speech demonstrates that the two are potential ly, although not
neces sarily always, at odd s . I maintain, as others have before me, that
desp ite the fact that the Constitution expressly provides Congress
with the power to enact copyright laws and only generally prohibits
Congressional interference with the freedom o f speech, the First

83.

See N.Y. Times Co. v. S u l livan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 ( 1 964):

Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the A labama courts have
appli ed a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions

on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law
has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though

suppleme nted by statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been
appl ied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
(citations omitted). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U . S . I ( 1 948) (holding ! at use of the

�

Judicial system to enforce a private agreement is state action impl icating Const1tut1onal nghts).
84.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Su l l ivan, 376 U.S. at 265.

85.

Id.
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Amendment can and does restrict the manner and means available to
86
Congress to effectuate its copyright power.
Not a l l Jaws enacted under one of Congress ' s enumerated
overlap

powers

with

implicate

even

or

the

First

Amendment

protection of speech, but some of those laws do. For example, were
Congress to pass, under its expressly enumerated power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes,"87 a proh i bition on the interstate shipment of
flammable l iquids without a permit issued by a federal authority, we
88
But were the
would find no conflict with the First Amendment.
hypothetical law one that prohibits the i n te rstate shipment o f Arabic
language texts without a permit issued by a Federal authority, the
analysis would change. Again, the law falls within the enumerated
commerce power. And yet any contemporary legal mind would balk
at the validity of such a law when considering it under the First
freedom o f speech (not to

Amendment. This abridgment o f the

mention of the press) would not b e vindicated by any court, even
following an analysis of any governmental interest pro ffered
support,

however

compelling

that

seem.

might

i nterest

in

The

prohibition would simply be too broad and too restrictive of protected
speech to be

found sufficiently

narrowly

tailored to

pass

First

Amendment muster.
Both hypothetical laws would survive review if express powers
necessarily trumped general limitations. That cannot be the case. The
that
89
otherwise would be fully within the Commerce Clause power.
Amendment

First

86.

See,

CONSTITUTION

removes

from

e.g. , Van Alstyne, supra note

Congress certain

6;

2

ENCYCLOPED IA

OF

powers

THE

AMERICAN

5 04-0 5 (Leonard W. Le:'y et al. eds., 1 986) (containing Melville Ni mmer's entry
.

on copynght, wherem Nimmer explams that the First Amendment specifically
limits those
powers entrusted to the federal government, including copyright, for "[i]f
it did not modify such
powers, it would have no meaning at all.").

3

87.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. (the Commerce Clause).
This law operates within the Commerce Clause sphere
and yet does not affect or even
.
implicate the freed m of peech that Congress may not
abridge. The law does not restrict in any
m nne th way m which flammable liquids may
be util ized by persons, includin g their
utlhzatlon m settmg fire to a United States flag
as part of one s exercise o f a right to free
.
.
.
expression. As such, no true conflict
exists between this particu lar law, validly enacted
under the
_
enumerated mtersta
te commerce power, and the prohib ition
contained within the First
Amendment.
�8.

�

�

� �

�

�

·

•

89.

See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 228-29 .

·
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laws may be found i nval i d if they attempt to
90

exercise powers removed by the First Amendment.
The Copyright Clause does not

differ from the Commerce

Clause in this respect: just as the existence of the Commerce C lause
as an express power does not allow it to evade First Amendment
scrutiny, neither can
Amendment.

The

the

Copyright

historical

sequence

C l ause

so evade the

of events

provides

First
some

evidence that the First Amendment was intended to limit otherwise
possible exercises of Congressional powers contained within the
91
In addition, scholars now hold a

Constitution as originally ratified.

fairly uniform view of the interplay o f the B i l l of Rights with the
Constitution, allowing for critical judicial review of otherwise valid
92
As such, the

enactments under enumerated Congressional powers.

90. The remai ning question is whether the Constitutionally protected freedom of speech
(or of the press) includes the freedom to ship Arabic-language books across state lines such that
the First Amendment would invalidate the hypothetical law. See id.
9 1 . On the other hand, the first federal copyright law and the Bill of Rights were both
enacted in 1 790, which might mean that the Founders saw no confl ict at all between the two. See
Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1 79 1 : An Essay Concerning the Founders ' View
of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L. J. 909, 943-44 (2003). Joyce and Patterson argue that there is no
conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, and that the hi storical sequence supports
this view, but they also argue that the potential for conflict disappears only when, like the first
U.S. copyright statute, the copyright term is limited to a short period of time and publication is
required for the existence of rights. Id. at 943-45. But because no d iscussion by the Founders of
copyright's particular relationship to free speech has been found, the Founders' view of a
specific interplay between the two cannot be concretely supported in e ither way. See id. at 94649; Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright
Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909, 9 1 9-28 (2002) (discussing in detail the
sources available regarding the adoption of the Copyright Clause, citing James Madison ' s Notes
of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1 787, which reflects that no debate occurred with
respect to the adoption of the Copyright Clause, and noting that the Clause was rarely mentioned
in subsequent ratification debates). At least one participant in the ratification debates is quoted
as believing the Copyri ght Clause to be compatible with the First A mendment freedom of the
press, see id. at 924-25 (quoting future Justice James Iredell of North Carolina on the subject),
but little else exists in the record on the topic. And despite the possibility that the Founders
considered the issue and saw no conflict between early copyright law and the First Amendment,
the general argument as to the import of the historical sequence still remains. The fact that a
sufficient number of early lawmakers determined a Bill of Rights to be necessary and advisable
must indicate that it controls, and was intended to control, Congress's enumerated powers.

92. For example, Neil Netanel notes that the Supreme Court has applied the First
Amendment on more than one occasion to restrain otherwise valid enumerated Article I powers,
such as the power to operate a post office, the power to punish counterfeiting of U.S. currency,
and the Federal District Clause power. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 38 n . 1 54. Netanel argues
si mply and convincingly that because the First Amendment has been held to restrain other
enumerated powers, and because there is nothing in the Copyright C l ause to suggest that it is
any different, there is no justi fication for an argument that copyright is somehow immune from a
free speech restraint by virtue of its Constitutional basis.
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Copyright Clause does not pose a limitation on th
the guaranteed freedoms of speech and press are

�

24

�

full exten of what

m

the fi rst instance.

Instead even when Congress stays within the power granted by the

�

Copyri h t Clause when it enacts a law, the First Amcnc.lm r t provides

��

an additional constraint on the freedom o f Congress to act.

·

3 . Other Arguments for First A mendment Control
A rather facile attempt to foreclose First Amendment control of
copyright m ight (and has) reasoned that as "property" grantee.I by law,
94
a copyright need not yield to the F irst Amendmenl.
The admi ttedly

Van A lstyne argues that the Constitution incl udes the copyright power for mueh the

93.

same reason that it includes the commerce power, namely, to "provide

a pre-emplin·

1mi/i1rmi1r

of law, in respect to the subject embraced by the clause." due to the "manifest undesirability of

perpetuating [the] uncheckable pluralism" within the patent and copyright lic.:lds that would be
created by a "patchwork of statute books, and common law. of each part i c u l a r state...
Alstyne, supra note

Yan

6, at 234-35. Van Alstyne's position is, then, that the Copyright Clause was

intended only to replace, and did simply replace, a power that would otherwise be hc.:ld by the
states. As such, he takes the position that "just as the Commerce Clause provision ' answers'
Federalism questions b u t not First Amendment questions, the same is

exact 1 ·

�

//'lie in re.,pecl 10

the Copyright Clause as well." Id. at 236. He concludes by stating that the Copyright Clause
"preempts" nothing within the protection of the First Amendment. [and] any
feature of any portion of any act Congress has, or may in the future. provide
under sanction of this clause, may always be brought into question respecting
whether, on its face or as applied, it offends against the larger freedom of speech
and of the press provided constitutional sanctuary in the First Amendment sti l l
unfolding in the United States.
Id. at 238. Van A l s tyne cites Campbell

v.

Acu,ff�Rose Music, Inc. and Hustler Maga:ine. Inc.

I'.

Moral Majority, Inc. as two cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the fair use provision
of section

107 to allow the uses, thus avoiding what would have otherwise been a head-on
2 3 8 n.34.

collision of the First Amendment with a claim of copyright infringement. Id. at

94.

This property vs. speech argument proceeds under more than one line o f argument.

The first is that the First Amendment does not require the private owner of real property to allow
the use of that property as a forum for free speech and therefore that the private owner of
intangible property, namely copyright-protected expression, is similarly not required to al low
the use of that expression in the exercise of free speech. The second is that fencing off (as it
were) certain language or symbols, even i f a speech restriction. is easily defensible as a valid

time, place or manner restriction on free speech - w h i c h incorporates the argument that a
speaker does not have the right to "make other people's speeches" when
exercising the
speaker's First Amendmen t rights. As to the second argument - the one that
brings up "other
people's speeches" - misses two issues: first, recall that neither "place"
nor " manner" in time,
place ' and manner restr'.ct�ons refers to the content of speech, instead
impl icating physical
.
location or a c haracteristic such as volume; and second, i
t ignores the definitive First

Amendment principle acknowledging that certain expressio
n has a commun icative speech 
related power that simply cannot always be equaled by
use of synonym ous or ubstitute
.
expression. Se Cohen v_. Californ ia, 403 U.S. 15, 26 ( t 97
1 ) ("(W]ords are often chosen as much
for their. emotive as their cogn itive force . . .
(!Jn the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile
.
.
assumphon �hat o?e can forbid particular words
withou t also running a substan tial risk of
suppres sing ideas 1 n the process."). In this regard
one may be reminded o f Judge Kozins ki 's
_
rather apt observation
that an argument denyin g a speake r the
right to use particu lar, chosen

�

�
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facile response to this argument is that whi l e real property does
i ndeed share certai n chara cteristi cs with i ntangi ble property, i ncludi ng
the basic pri nci ple of the right to excl ude, the two forms of "property"
are not si mi lar i n all res pe cts, part i c ularly with respect to the i nterplay
with the First Ame ndme nt. Real property, with respect to s pee ch, i s
only a forum for s pee ch, while the language o r expression withi n the
95
copyright "property" ri ght is the spee ch.
The two forms of property
quite

si mply

cannot

be

l umped

together

when

explori ng

the

i ntera ction with the First Amendme nt. I n addi t i o n, no property ri ght i s
s o absolute a s t o re buff all unwanted uses, parti cularly uses i n the
96
public interest.
I n his comprehe nsi ve arti cle on the i nterplay of copyright with
the First Ame ndme nt, Neil Netanel revie ws a number of j ustifi cati o ns
that are proffered for setti ng copyri ght a s i de, out of the purview of the
97
In parti cular, he
First Amendment, and he finds the m a l l la cki ng.
argues that the "i nternal safeguards" cla i m presented by the Court i n
98
Eldred si mply c a nnot hold up over ti me. I nternal safety val ve s may
need to be shored up now and the n or suppleme nted, and the alleged
past harmony of copyright and free spee ch cannot be conti nua l ly used
99
to de ny free speech challenges to elements of the copyright laws. He
notes that at the time of New York Times v. Sullivan, libel had i ts own
i nternal free s p e e ch safeguards, such as the traditi onally recogni zed
privileges for bookstores and li braries that sold defamatory material
1 00
origi na lly published by others.
Those safeguards di d not dissuade
the Court from explori ng libel's i nfri nge me n t of free speech i n

language through mere invocation of the protection of an intellectual property right "no more
answers the first amendment concerns here than to suggest that Paul Robert Cohen could have
worn a jacket saying 'I Strongly Resent the Draft."' Int'l Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts

& Athletics, 789 F.2d 1 3 1 9, 1 32 1 (9th Cir. 1 986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 ( 1 987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Judge Kozinski's observation in his dissent in the decision
below).
95.

See also Netanel, supra note 6, at 39 (acknowledging that real property rights are

somewhat immune to a free speech restraint but arguing that a real property right poses an
incidental burden on expressive freedom while a copyright creates a direct burden on expressive
freedom since the right is specifically directed to information and communication).
96.

And whether copyright is viewed as a property right or economic regulation, it i s

expressly not absolute - as shown b y the requirement that an otherwise infringing use not b e a
fair use before copyright liability may be imposed, see 1 7 U.S.C . §§ I 06, I 07 (2000), in addition
to a number of other specific statutory exceptions and exemptions, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 06, 1 081 2 1 (2000).
97.

See Netanel, supra note 6, at 37-47.

98.

Id. at 40-42.

99.

Id.

100.

Id. at 4 1 .
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it determined
connec tio n with comme ntary o n pub l i c official s,. and I
O
J
. .
was required .
•
that additio nal, non-trad1t10nal protec t 10n

Eugene Volokh, on the other h and, does not generally dispute the

copyright "exception," by w h i c h copyright ' s constituti onal basis
differentiates it from other speech restrictions. 1 02 Yet even he argues
for First Amendment restraint. 1 03 I n particular, he argues against
certain justifications for lack o f First A mendment restraints, such as
the claim that copyright-infringing speech is less valuable than other
speech because it is unoriginal. 1 0 4 This was claimed by the Court in

Eldred when it stated "[t]he Fir s t A m endment securel y protects the
freedom t o make-or decline to make--one ' s own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's

speeches . " 1 0 5 Volokh finds simil arly unpersuasive the justifi cation of
a copyright owner ' s right to refrai n from speaking, as discussed in
Harper & Row

v.

Nation Enterprises.

1 06

Not only does Volokh point

to the value to listeners of cop i e d speech as a means o f information
dissemination and the value that repeating speech may have within
the realm of self-realization or s e l f-expression, but he a l so analyzes
and debunks the comparison of copyright infringement t o compelled
speech. 1 07

Both Volokh and Netan e l

persuasively

argue

against

various means that have been asserted t o remove copyright fr o m First
Amendment scrutiny.
D. Copyright 's Speech Benefits
Although copyright may, i n fact, encourage the production and
dissemination of speech, that speech-enhancing qua l i ty does not
eliminate o r sideline the ability o f the First Amendment t o shape and
control copyright. The Supreme C ourt h a s urged that copyright serves
a

speech

free

purpose

by

encouraging

the

production

and

dissemination of speech that m ay then remain under the l i m ited

control of the speaker or author rather t h an the govern ment. 1 08 Some

arguments go further, holding that any theoretical restriction on the
First Amendment -protected "freedom o f speech" by copyright must
I0I .

Id.

1 02.

See Volokh, supra note

1 03.

I 04.
1 05.

Id. at 7 1 4-32.

Id.

at

6, at 7 1 3- 1 4, 72 5 .

725-27.

Eldred

v.

Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1 87, 2 2 1 (2003 ) .

6, at 727-3 2. See also Harper & Row P
u b ( is
' h ers, I nc.
Na11on Enters. , 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 ( 1 985).
I 07. See Volok h, supra note 6, at 725-3 2.
'.°6.

1 08.

See Volokh, supra note

See Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 5
58.

v.
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be countenanced i n l i ght o f copyright's pursuit o f this speech
enhancing, lofty constitutional goal, namely, the encouragement o f
authorial production fo r the promoti o n o f scientific and artistic
1
progress. 09 The Court h as not rejected this l i ne of thought: "The
Copyright Clause and F i rst Amendment were adopted close in time.
This proximity indicates that, i n the Framers ' view, copyright ' s
limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed
copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free
expression ." 1 10 The Court did, on the other hand, reject the idea that
copyright is thereby "categorically immune" from First Amendment
scrutiny. 1 1 1
The implication, i f not the outright assertion, of the Court in
emphasizing copyright ' s free speech benefits i s that copyright is
functionally, although not theoretically, i mmune to First Amendment
regulation in light of its First Amendment enhancing characteristics
and the vague limitations provided within fair use and the idea
exp ression distinction. 1 1 2 In my view, however, the speech-enhancing
characteristics of copyright's utilitarian purpose and structure do not
grant categorical i mmunity to any and every statutory copyright
sche me chosen by Congress. 1 1 3 To use a hypothetical s ituation for a
point

of comparison:

the

speech-enh ancing

characteristics

and

purpose of a free, government-sponsored forum, such as a local
access radio station, would not bar a F i rst-Amendment challenge i f
the regulations apportioning use o f the forum between appl i cants
resulted in suppression of speech from certain groups, even i f that
forum provided li mited rights of rep ly. Even if the goal and primary
function of copyright, like the hypothetical forum, were to encourage

I 09.

See, e.g.,

1 1 0.

Eldred, 537 U . S . at 2 1 9.

1 1 1.

Id.

McGowan, supra note 6, at 332-38.

at 22 1 .

See. e.g., id. ("[W)hen, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."). See also
McGowan, supra note 6 (arguing that while there may be a relationship between copyright and
the First Amendment, the First Amendment can provide no real means for judicial control over
Congressional copyright enactments); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. , Copyright Under Siege: The
First Amendment Front, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 4 1 , 6 1 (2004) (arguing that copyright's
enhancement of speech, in conjunction with the idea-expressio n dichotomy and fair use, avoids
1 1 2.

"any real, intrinsic tension" between copyright and the First Amendment).

1 1 3.
See M iami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 4 1 8 U.S. 2 4 1 ( 1 974) (invalidating a state
right-of-reply statute although it was intended, at least in part, to increase the informat on
available to the public); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U . S. I ( 1 976) (striking federal limits on electwn
expenditures despite the fact that those limits were designed to provide a more equal political
playing field for less wealthy individuals and groups).

�
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the creation o f additional speech, the goal and function p rov ide no
4

ultimate First Amendment protection . 1 1

Because the First Amendment c a n guide and shape copyright,
copyright law must provide adequate breathing room for the exercise
of the freedom o f speech. The Court has thus far o n l y appl ied
rational-basis scrutiny, rather than a stricter First Amendment level of
scrutiny, to federal copyright law a n d its connection to the Copyright
1 15
Nevertheless, the fact that c o pyright clearly restricts speech

C lause.

mandates either that copyright law be structured to allow s o m e outlets
for the

exerci se

speech

of free

use

by

of copyri ght-protected

expression, when appropriate, or that the courts be w i l l i n g a n d able to
perform separate F i rst Amendment rev i ew in copyright cases. The
specific leve l of scrutiny to be appl i e d to copyright is not my concern
1 16 For
the purposes of this a rticle, it is sufficient t o argue that
here.

1 1 4.

Accord Netanel, supra note 6, at 42. As to copyright's asserted free speech hen..:fits.

Netanel makes the point that there are other laws advocated as beneficial to free speech in th..:
form of dissemination of a variety of expression, such as the must-carry rules for cabk
television or some campaign finance restrictions, and yet these laws are not immune to scrutiny.

In addition, he argues that copyright's expansion over the years may mean that the free speech

benefits are shrinking in comparison to the expanded restrictions.
115.
1 1 6.

See Eldred, 5 3 7 U.S. at 204-08.

Commentators debate the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to copyright and

whether copyright is a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech. For purposes of
this article, it is sufficient to argue that copyri ght is indeed subject to F i rst Amendment scrutiny
of some sort, rather than being somehow theoretically or functionally immune to a free speech
challenge, including limited immunity by virtue of the presence of internal safeguards al leged to
protect the freedom of expression. I believe this to be so because my conclusion is that under
any level of scrutiny used for a speech-regulating law (which copyright is). the restraint is not
currently tailored in any way to the interest being promoted. In this way, my position may echo
that of Justice Breyer in his dissent in Eldred:

I would review plausible claims that a copyright statute seriously. and
un1 ustifiably, restricts the dissemination o f speech somewhat more carefu l l y than
reference to t�is Court's traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence might
.
suggest. There 1 s no need m this case to c haracterize that review as a search
for
"congruence and proportionality," or as some other variation of what
this Court
has called "intermediate scrutiny." Rather, it is necessary only
to recognize that
.
this statute mvolves not pure economic regulation , but regulation
of expressio n.
and wh�t may count as rational where economic regulation
is at issue i s not
.
necessan ly rational
where we focus on expression-in a Nation constitut
ionally
ded1c ated to the free d1ssemmat1on of speech, i n formatio
n, learning . and culture.
.
In this sense only, and where line-dra w i n g among
constitutional interests is at
issue, I would look harder than does the majorit
y at the statute ' s rationa lity
though less hard than precedent might justify
.

Eldred, 537 � . S . at 244 (Breyer, J , dissen
ting) (citati ons omitted).
.
N.�11 Ne;anel has focused upon the locatio
n of copyright within the F i rst Amcndmt!nt
.
categoncal skem , (as he calls it)
argui ng th at 1t is a content-neutral
speech regulati on as
opposed to a content-based speech
regulafion, a con d uct regulation. or
some other category of
.
.
govemmenta 1 regul atwn. The ultima
te thrust of Netan cl ·s article is
that as a conte nt-neutral
•

·

·

·

�

·

.
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copyright is subj ect to First Amendment scrutiny of some sort, rather
than being somehow immune to a free speech chal lenge altogether, or
immune by virtue of the presence of internal safeguards alleged to
protect the freedom of expression.
Having demonstrated that the First Amendment can and should,
in appropriate instances, limit the manner and means available for
implementation of the Copyright Clause, the next issue becomes
whether there are indicia of that restraint present in current copyright
law and jurisprudence. As noted above, the Court relies upon the
distinction between ideas and expression and upon the fair use
1 17
defense,
and here I focus on the role of the fair use defense as a
safeguard for protected speech. I argue that the Court errs in asserting
that fair use is a primary locus within copyright for harmonization
with the guarantee of freedom of speech. Fair use does not contain
any real First Amendment restraints.

OF A FI RST AMENDMENT PURPOSE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR USE

I I I . ABSENCE

A.

Early History ofFair Use

Our fair use defense originated from the "fair abridgment"
doctrine developed by English courts in the eighteenth century. The
early English cases created a limit on the copyright owner's rights:
those rights included the right to prevent a "mere evasion" of
copyright by only "colourably shorten[ing]" a work but did not
include the right to "restrain persons from making a real and fair
abridgment, for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new
book, because not only the paper and print, but the intention, learning
and judgment of the author is shewn in them." 1 1 8 Fair abridgment

speech regulation, copyright is deserving of heightened intermediate scrutiny as a governmental
alloca tion of a speech entitlement under the rationale of Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 5 1 2
U.S. 622, 661 -62 ( 1 994). See Netanel, supra note 6, at 47-69.
Eugene Volokh disagrees, finding copyright to be content-based speech regulation.
Volokh, supra note 6, at 703- 1 1 . Despite that finding, with its attendant heightened scrutiny,
Yolokh does not find copyright to be per se invalid. Instead he argues that it is in fact largely
valid despite its categorization as a content-based restriction. He compares it to obscenity and
libel laws in that those laws are also content-based and are yet largely valid due to the
compelling governmental interests being promoted, which in the case of copyright would be the
economic reward to authors that our system uses to promote creation and publication of new
works. See id. at 7 1 3 .
1 1 7. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
See

1 1 8. Gyles v. Wi lcox, ( 1 740) 2 Atk . 1 4 1 , 1 43 (No. 1 3 0); see also Tonson v. Walker,
( 1 752) 3 Swans. 67 1 , 677 (App.). William Patry provides a comprehensive overview of the
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eventually developed into the fair use doctrine, both i n England and in
the United States. 1 1 9 Th is early fair use doctrine protected a defendant
from liab i lity for copying another's work for the pu rpose of creating
20
In his monograph on the
abridgments reviews or criticisms. 1

f

privilege of air use,

William Patry p o i nts to Gray

v.

Russe/1 1 2 1 as the

first American case discussin g the concerns that would later be
1 22
In
molded i nto the American version o f the fair use doctrine.
dictum i n that case, Justice Story, sitti n g on circu it, prese nted certain
issues worthy of consideration when evaluating a de fense that a work
121
was a n o ninfringing review or abridgment: the purpose of the usc,
1 2�
a n d the quantity
the effect upon the author's legitimate i nterests,
25
1
and quality of the portions used.
early English cases, including Gyles and Tonson, in his monograph on th.: fa ir us.: d di:ns.: See

.

WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-18 ( 2 d ed. 1 995).

And during further development o f fair use, although the ne.:d for limitations un the

1 19.

otherwise absolute nature of copyright rema ined appealing to the judiciary and the legislature.
the idea that an abridgment of a work rightfully fell within the scope of the limitations rather
than the scope of the copyright did not. Over time, abri dgments were found to be in fringements
rather than fair uses. See 17 U . S.C. § l (b) (1909) (repealed 1978); see also Story v. Holcombe,
23 F. Cas. 171, 172 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497); C op right Act of 19 1 1. 1 & 2 Geo. 5. c.

y

46, § 2( I )(i) ( Eng.) (bringing fair use within British statutory cop right law but el iminating

y

abridgments from the codified doctrine, by excluding from infringement .. [a]ny fair dealing with
any work for the purposes of private study,

research, criticism, review, or newspaper

summary").

See generally PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 6-63.

1 20.
121.

Gray v. Russe l l , 10 F. Cas. 1035 ( C.C. D. Mass. 1839) ( N o. 5 . 7 2 8 ).

122.

See PATRY, supra note 118, at 19.

123.

Gray, 1 0 F. Cas. at 1 038:

[ l]f large extracts are made [from a work] in a review, it might be a question,
whether those extracts were designed bona fide for the mere purpose of criticism,
or were designed to supersede the original work under the pretence of a review.
by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in

relation to an abridgement of an original work. The question, in such a case. must
be compounded of various considerations [including] whether it be a bona
fide

abridgment, or only an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts
.
1 24.
Id. ("The question [in an abridgmen t] must be compounded of various considerati ns
o
.
.
[mcludmg]
whether it w i l l, in its present form, prejudice or supersede the original
work · whether
it will be adapted to the same class of readers; and many other
considera tions of he same
sort.").

�

1 25.

id. at I 038-39:

�

In ma y cases, the question may natural l y tum upon
the point, not so much of the
quantity , s f the value of the selected materials
. . . . The quintessence of a work
may be p raticall y extracted, so as to leave a mere
caput mortuum, by a selection
. a
of all the 1 portant passages m
comparativel y moderate space.
.
On this pomt, Justice Story quoted the English case
of Bramwell v. Halcomb , 3 M y1ne & C ra1g
·
737, 738 (Ch. 1 836), where in The Lord Chanc ellor
Cottenham stated:
When it com s to a question of quantity,
it must be very vague. One writer mi
gh t
take a l l the vital part o f another's book
, thoug h i t might be but a sma I I propo
rtion

� �
'.
�

�
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Two years later, Justice Story, again s1ttmg on circuit, issued
another opinion concern ing some of the same defensive issues from
1 26
Gray v. Russell in the case of Folsom v. Marsh.
In Folsom,
plaintiffs work consisted of eleven volumes containing letters written
127
plus one volume containing a

by President G eorge Washington

biography of the Presiden t ' s life, for a total of a lmost seven thousand
pages. The defendan t ' s work consisted of two volumes in which the
life of Washington was told through

the

use of certain of the

President's letters, with n arrative interspersed between to connect and
explain the story . The defendant copied at least two hundred fi fty-five
1 28

pages of Washington ' s private letters from the p l ai ntiff s work.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendant' s use of Washington ' s
letters constituted

copyright

infringement,

while

the

defendant

countered that h i s work was noninfringing although it used material
from plaintiff s

work.

The

defendant

contended that h i s

work

constituted a new and original work because it used only selected
1 29
As characterized by

portions of the plaintiff s twelve-volume work.

Justice Story, while the defendant 's work may h ave been a new work
that "cannot properly be treated as an abridgment of that of the
plaintiffs [or] strictly and wholly a mere compilation from the latter,"
the work did cons ist of some copying, as it did "not profess to give
fugitive extracts, or bri lliant passages from particular letters [and was]
a selection of the entire c ontents of particular l etters, from the whole
1 0
collection or mass of l etters of the work of the plaintiffs. " 3 In
addition, Story noted that "[f]rom the known taste and ab i lity of
[defendant], it cannot be doubted, that these l etters are the most
instructive , useful and interesting to be found in that large
collection." 1 3 1
Story recognized that an author writing for the purpose o f "fair
and reas onable criticism" could "fairly c ite largely from the original

of the book in quantity. I t is not only quantity, but value that is always looked to.

Gray,

It is useless to look to any particular cases as to quantity.

10 F. Cas. at 1 039 .
1 26. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1 84 1 ) ( N o . 4,90 1 ).
1 27. Plaintiffs copyright in the letters arose by bequest of the letters from

Washington to
his nephew, from
whom the plaintiff acquired rights before publishing the letters for the first
time . Und er then-cu
rrent law, the copyright term was measured from publication. Id. at 345.

128.
1 29.

Id.

1 30.
131.

Id. at

Defendant also raised other objections to the infringement claim, including an
argument that Washing
objections
ton's letters were not protected by copyright, although those
were unsuccessful . See id.
a t 345-47 .
Id.

347-48.
at 348.
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gment of an origi nal work
work" and that a "fair and bona fide abrid
1 3 2 On the other hand , he noted
[was] not a pirac y of the copyright ."
"the whol e subst ance of
that infrin geme nt would exist in a case w here
with slight omis sions and
one work has been copied from anoth er,
133
The quest ion presented in Folso m was
formal di fferences only."
was j ustifia ble and
whether the defendant's use o f p laintiff s work
l�
.
. fi "
thus nomn rmgmg .
, where a
Justic e Story characterized cases of this nature

inging, as
defendant ' s admitte d use of a prior work may yet be noninfr
nature and
being of a sort "in which it i s not, from the peculia r
tory
character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfac
all
conclusi on, or to lay down any general principle s applicab le to
1 35
r
particula
s
'
Story
Many l ater cases have quote d Justice
cases."
language from Folsom:
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value o f
the materials used, and the degree i n w h i c h the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the obj ects, o f the
. .
1 36
ongma l work .

Importantly,

Story

not

did

apply

each

of

these

factors

individually to the facts of the case before him. Instead, S tory focused
upon the value o f the copyrighted work and, through that lens,
determined that the copyright had been infringed:
[I]f the defendants may take three h u ndred and nineteen letters, . . .
there i s no reason why another bookseller may not take other five
hundred letters, and a third, one thousand letters, and so on, and
Besides;

thereby the plaintiff's copyright be totally destroyed.

every one must see, that the work o f the defendants is mainly
founded up on these letters, constituting more than one thi rd of
their work, and imparting to i t its greatest, nay, its essent i a l value.

Without those letters, in its present form the work must fall to the

1 32.
1 33.
1 34.
1 35.

Id. at 344.

Id.

Id. at 348.

Id. at 344.

�s put by Patry, "Looked at out o f [the context of the facts and Sto

·

's full
Are these factors of equal we1g ht?. Wh at
ry ab out
.
.
.
.
conflicts between the factors?· D0 we begm t he mqu1ry by exammin
g a specific factor? Under
.
what circumstances are we to examine the factors at all?" PATRY,
supra note 1 1 8 at 2 1 .
1 36. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. See e .g., c amp be II
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0 U.S.
569 , 576 ( 1 994) (quotmg th e above passage from Folso m) ·' Son
.
y C0 � · of Am. v. Universa l City
.
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 475 n.27 0 984 Blac
kmun, J., dissentmg) (same). Justice Story's
language even found its way back into Eng is case
law. See Scott v. Stanford, ( 1 867) L.R. 3
Eq. 7 1 8, 722.
_

.
opm1�n], the passage 1s of little
practical value.

·

'

·

�· \

· '

·

.
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ground. It i s not a case, where abbrevi ated or select passages are
taken from particular letters; but the entire letters are taken, and
those of most interest and value to the public, as i l lustrating the
1 37
life, the acts, and the character of Washington.

Other scholars have noted how important the factors i n Folsom
138
Justice

became, and still are, to our statutory law and jurisprudence.

Story did not treat his factors in Folsom as a comprehensive checklist
to be mechanically applied in all fair use cases, nor did he intend for
them to serve as such. The opinion shows that these factors are non
exclusive, malleable, and adjustable considerations, relevant in some
cases but not in others. Justice Story simply characterized the then
current state of the law as he understood it, and proceeded to resolve
the case presented. He expressly regretted that he did not feel free to
take other important issues into account, such as the merit and effort
3
demonstrated by the defendant's new work. 1 9
Justice Story ' s opinion in Folsom does not mention the First
Amendment or free speech rights. Not surprisingly, none of the fair
use decisions written by Story or his contemporaries discuss "free
speech." This lack of attention to issues regarding the freedom of
speech

is

not

surprising,

since

at

the

time

Story

and

his

contemporaries wrote, the First Amendment p ossessed little of the
1 0
prohibitory firepower it holds today. 4 But in light of the First
Amendment 's c u rrent power and vitality within modem society and
jurisprudence, if fair use is to be used to protect speech interests, I
maintain that it would be improper to apply an analysis from

1 84 1

without taking into account the vast changes i n the First Amendment
landscape.
B. From Folsom to the 1 960s
The case law and scholarship between Folsom and the enactment
of the

1 976 Copyright Act show that the fair use doctrine broadened

from abridgment and review to include other forms of criticism,
parody, and quotation. 1 4 1 This broadenin g is the primary feature of the

1 37.

Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.

1 38.

See, e.g

139.

See Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 349.

PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 24; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 1 03 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 05, 1 1 05 ( 1 990). See also Campbell, 5 1 0 U.S. at 5 76; Sony
Corp. , 464 U.S. at 475 n.27.
.•

140.
See, e.g., William J . Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 , 1 -2 ( 1 965).
141.

During this period, abridgments were removed from the scope of the fair use doctrine.

See supra note 1 1 9.
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development of fair use during this long period of time. An

1 870

treatise characterized the general avai labi lity of the fair use de fense to
a claim

made by a commerc ial c o mpetitor:

"It

is

a recognized

principle that every author, compi ler, or publ isher may make certain
uses of a copyrighted work, in the preparation of a rival or other
1 42
publication."
During this time period, courts regularly appl ied the
fair use doctrine in various commerc i a l contexts; it was not restricted
to noncommercial uses. The lack of a regular, meaningfu l distinction
between commercial and noncommerc ial use in this period makes the
insertion of the distinction into fair use in the 1 9 76 Cop y right Act,
discussed below at Part 1 1 1.D, difficult to rationalize.

L.

Ray Patterson, who

wrote

extensively

on

the

as

historical

development of copyright, argued that in all o f the early years o f the
fair use doctrine, at least up to the 1 909 Copyright Act, courts did not
apply the doctrine to a non-competitive or non-c o m mercial

use,

largely because those uses were not w i thin the scope o f the copyright
1 43
As he argued the i s sue, both the fair-abridgment

owner' s rights.

history o f the

doctrine and the

infringement to commercial,

g e neral restriction

of copyright

marketplace uses and

not

personal,

consumer uses meant that fair use ori g inally aimed to excuse certain
uses despite their being potentially competitive with the original
144
Fair use was not limited to s i tuations where the second use
work.
1 45
Commerc ial c o ncerns, to the
did not compete with the original.
extent considered, were subsumed w i th i n the inquiry i nt o hann to the
1 46
Through much of the development
market for the p laintiffs work.
of the

fair use doctrine, then ,

distinctio n

between

courts

commerci a l

and

did not typ i c a l l y
noncommerc i a l

make a

uses

whe n

working through a fair use analysis.

1 42.

EATON S . DRONE, A TREATISE O N T H E LAW O F PROPERTY

PRODUCTIONS 386 ( 1 879) (emphasis added ) .

1 43 .

1 :-;

1 :-> T E L LECTLAL

P at te rson supra note 14, at 38-40.

,

Id. Jessica Litman concurs: "prior to the 1 976 Act , almost a
l l f:air
· use case Iaw
.
involved commercial uses."
Jessi ca D L l!man,
Copy1 1ght. Comp1 om1se. and Lc�1slat/\·e
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 898 n.256 ( 1 98 7 ) . Litman made that
statement in th� course
.
of cnllctzmg the Supreme Court's express d.1 s cn m m
at1 o n against commerc ial uses and its
. .
.
d1stmct1on of those uses from noncommercial uses
in Sony Corp of A m . v u ni· versa 1 c 1ty
·
.
Studio s, I nc., 464 u s 4 1 7 0984), and Harper & Ro
w, Publishe rs , Inc. v . Nation Enters 471
.
U.S. 539 ( 1 985), call mg the discrimination and
distinct ion "the Court ' s own mvcnt1on:
·
1· 1 re 1·1c d
·
on no prior cases to derive them." Id. at 898_

1 44.

·

History,

.

.

. ·

·

.

·

·

·

·

·

·

"

·

..

P atterson , supra note 14, at 38-40.
See id. at 4 3 ( observing that Fol
f som, 1h e case general ly credited with setting the
standard for fair use ' inc l uded economic
e feet o f a use as a f:ac tor but d 1
' d not include the nature
o f the use a s a separate factor).

1 45.
1 46.

.
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One notable aberration, where a court did expressly distinguish
between commercial and noncommerc ial purposes, was Henry Holt &
Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 1 47 Henry Holt involved the
defendant's

use

of three

sentences

from

a

scientific

book

in

defendant 's advertising pamphlet regarding its tobacco products.
Defendant, Liggett & Myers, had in its pamphl et entitled "Some facts
about Cigarettes" asked and answered the question "Do c igarettes
affect the throat?" The pamphlet stated :
Dr. Leon Felderman, noted oto-laryngologist, Philadelphia, i s
quoted ( 1 93 1 ) as follows: "' Statistics have i t that 80 per cent o f
phys icians are smokers

* * *

It appears unan imous that smoking as

not nearly so injurious as over-eating

*

*

*

From my experience

with ear, nose and throat cases, I firmly believe that tobacco, when

" 48
properly used, has no ill effect upon the auditory passages. '1

Despite the brevity of the material used and its inabil ity to
supersede the purpose of or market for plaintiffs work, the court

ruled the use i n fringing rather than fair. 1 49 In so doing, it p laced a
previously unknown restriction on the fair use defense' s abi l ity to
excuse a commercial use. The court v iewed fair use as a doctrine
designed only to allow
those working in the field of science or art to make use of ideas,
opinions, or theories, and in certain cases even the exact words
contained in a copyrighted book in that field . . . . in order "that the

ri

world may not be de rived of improvements, nor the progress of
the arts be retarded."

1 0

The court thought defendant 's use fe l l outside the fields of science
and art, and it decided that uses having a "purely commercial
purpose," such as the advertising pamphlets in question, were not
15
worthy of the fair use privi lege. 1
More important to the court than the defendant's commercial
purpose was plaintiff s allegation that the use of Dr. Felderrnan ' s
work in a cigarette advertisement h a d "cast reflections upon his
professional ethics and (had] brought down upon him the term
'commercialist,' all of which has contributed to negative and deter the

147.

Henry Holt & Co.

148.

Id. at 303.

149.
1 50.
M oore,

151.

I

v.

Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23

F . Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1 93 8).

Id. at 304.
Id. (quoting language from an English case authored by Lord Mansfield, Sayre
East. 3 61 ).

Id.

v.
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sale of his book."

1 52

[Vol. 24

As such, the court was actually focusing on the

influence of the defendant's use upon the market for plaint ifr s work,
rather than the commerciality of the use per se. But at the same time,
the

court

was

also

allowing

critical

or

reputational

e ffects

to

overcome the proper focus of the market inquiry, spec i fi cally whether
defendan t ' s use supersedes the p lace o f plainti ff s work in the market.
The modem S upreme Court has made it clear that a use that subjects
the plaintiff's work to criticism or even ridicule does not create the
harm to be considered in fair use - instead the relevant hann is
1 53

restricted to harm via market d i sp l acement and similar damagc.

In limiting fair use to works advancing knowledge and exc luding
uses with a "commercial purpose," the Henry Holt court did not focus
on whether the defendant sold its work for profit. To the contrary, the
court equated commercial purpose with an advertising use by which
defendant sought to profit from a product other than its a l legedly
infringing work. The court did not equate commercial purpose with
the defendant ' s pursuit of profits through sale of the defendant's new
work.
The decision i n Henry Holt dev i ated from then then-traditional
doctrine of fair use. In raising a bar to uses with "a purely commercial
purpose" and favoring only uses within the same "field of art or
science," the court largely restricted fair use to uses competitive with
the original work. The previous tre n d had been to i n c l ude all uses,
including commercial uses, within the broad range of uses that were
potentially fair. On the other hand, competitive uses - uses i n the
same field or uses that might supersede the original - were the least
1 54
In l ight of other considerati o n s within fair
likely to be j udged fair.
use ignored by the Henry Holt decision, such as whether the second
use could damage the original work by superseding it, this court's
analysis i s unusual indeed. The decision did not gain traction, and its
commercial-purpose analysis cannot b e said to have persuaded many
later courts. Overall, the general trend of broadening the range of

Id. at 303.

1 52.

See Campbell v . Acuff-Rose Music, I n c . , 5 1 O U . S . 569, 5 9 1 -93 ( 1 994
).
&e a �ence v . Dana, 1 5 F. Cas. 2 6 , 6 1 ( C . C . D. Mass. 1 869) ( N
o . 8. 1 36). See also
K ar1 v. C urt1s u l g c o 39 F. Supp. 836, 8 3 7-38 (E.D. Wis. 1 957):
The rule is w l l s a d in 1 8 C.J.S., Copyrig ht &
Literary Property § 94, subd.
C ., (3)' · 2 1 9. ' *
Nevertheless the cases frequently lay stress
�
on the fact of
.
competition,
or the lack of it, in determ ining whethe r the
amount of matter copied
153.

��

1 �4.

.•

� ��

1s reasonable m amount and character or is an
infringement. and 1·t ·1s sa fie to say
.
that w here t he Iater work differs greatly in nature
scope, an d purpose from the
on gmal, a larger liberty m makm g quotat ions
and abstracts will be permitted than
m cases where the respec11ve works are more or
less competitive.
.

.

.

•

.

.
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potentially fair uses, and continuing to include commerci al uses
1 55

within that range, continued in the courts into the I 960s.

C. Free Speech Interests and Fair Use in the 1960s
Express consideration of free speech concerns did not arise i n
copyright decisions

until

the

1 960s,

perhaps

because

the

First

Amendment had not

been, until then, authoritatively app l ied to
1 56
restrain private civil actions,
nor had it been broadly appl ied to
prohibit or curtai l the imposition of formerly traditional restraints on
157
speech.
When free speech interests were asserted in the copyright
context,

the

courts

shoehorned

the

pub l i c ' s

interest

in

the

dissemination of expression and ideas i nto the familiar framework o f
1 58
fair use, rather than considering speech o n i t s own merits.
Two o f
the earliest fair use decisions in w h i c h the courts considered the
public interest in dissemination of speech p rotected by the First
Amendment in connection with their application of the fair use
doctrine are Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. and
1 59
In those cases, the fair use
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.
and idea-expression doctrines proved capable of being interpreted t o
avoid the possible conflict between speech and the copyright c l ai m . I n
both cases the courts ruled i n favor o f fair use, and i n s o doing
mooted any separate First Amendment claim the defendants could
have raised.
In Rosemont, the Second C ircuit appl ied the doctrine o f fair use
to the defendant ' s unquestionable use i n a b iography of material from
1 60
magazine arti cles in which plaintiff owned the copyright.
The court
ruled the use to be fair and overturned the district court's grant of a
preliminary inj unction. The court quoted a copyright treatise i n

1 55.

See Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 54 1 , 543 (2d Cir. 1 964) ("Wh i l e indeed

broad, the area in which a copyright proprietor is permitted the exclusive commercial benefits o f
his copyrighted work i s clearly not without limit.").
1 5 6.
1 57.

See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sull ivan, 376 U.S. 254 ( 1 964).

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 3 1 5 U.S. 568 ( 1 942) (restricting to the narrow

category of fighting words the constitutional abridgment of the right to utter insulting, abusive,

and offensive words); N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 (instituting a First Amendment restriction
on

a

libel cause of action). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 ( 1 957); A Book Named

"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. General, 383 U . S. 4 1 3 ( 1 966)
(restricting consti tutional bans on works or activities with sexual content to bans on content
meeting the test for obscenity contained in those cases).
1 58.

See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1 966);

159.

Rosemont Enters. , 3 66 F.2d 303; Time, 293 F . Supp. 1 30.

Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 1 30 ( S . D.N. Y . 1 968).
160.

Rosemont Enters., 3 66 F.2d at 306.
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characterizing fair use as "'a privilege in others than the owner of a
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner.

"' 1 6 1

According

to

the

justification" for fair use is
sciences,

court,

because

the

advancing progress

"[w]hether the pri v ilege

"fundamental

in

may justi fiably

the arts and
be applied to

particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e . g.,

whether their distribution would serve the public interest in the free
dissemination o f information and whether their preparation requires
2
some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject mattcr . " 1 6
The court emphasized the pub l i c benefit to be c reated by the
dissemination of the work, a biography of Howard Hughes, and
resoundingly

chastised the

lower

c ourt for

its

focus

upon

the

commercial nature of defendant ' s work, which was a des igned for the
popular market rather than academ i a :
[T]he district court i n emphasizing the commercial aspects o f the

Hug he s b i og raphy failed to recognize that "[a ] I I pub! ications
presumably are operated for profit" and that "both commercial and
artistic elements are involved in a l most every [work]" Thus, we
conclude that whether an author or publ isher has a commercial
motive or writes in a popular styl e i s irrelevant to a determ ination
of whether a particular use of copyrig hted material i n a work
1 63
which offers some benefit to the pub l ic constitutes a fai r use.

A concurring opinion to which two judges subscribed e x p ressly raised

free speech concerns; the maj ority opinion did not . The concurrence

considered the p ublic benefit purpose o f copyright and how c opyright

laws must yield to the public benefit p rotected and c o n ferred by the
First Amendment:
The spirit of the First Amendment appl ies to the copyright laws at

�east to the ext�nt that the courts should not tolerate any attempted

mterference with the pub l i c ' s rig h t to be informed

�

regarding

matters of general int rest when anyone seeks to use the copyright
.
statute which was designed to protect interests of quite a d i fferent
1 64
nature.

161.
Id. at 306 (quoting HORACE G . BAL L
L,
AW OF COPYRIGH T AND LITERARY PROPERTY
260 ( 1 944)) See ajso supra note 26 and ac co m panyi
ng text.
·

1 62.

1 63 .

Rosemont Enters ., 366 F.2d at 307.
Id.

Id. at 3 1 1 (Lumbard, J. concurrin
.
g ) J ud ges Lumbard and Hays, m
the concurring
opinion, expressed skepti cism that the
I a m t.1 f was attempting to protect a copyrig
ht interest.
characterizin g the plaint iff company
.
as th e instrument of H owar
d H ug h es, created pnnc1pally
for the purpose of suppressing the bio gra h
,
.
P Y of H u ghes , tn
order to "restric t the d issem i nat ion
1 64.

.

.

�.

f

.
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In the Bernard Cit'is case. the defendan ts copied a n umber o f
frames

from

Abraham

fi l m

Zapruder ' s

o f t h e assassination

of

President John F . Kennedy. and then reproduced sign i ficant porti ons

of twenty-two of t hose
amounted lo

exact

frames

copies

in

of the

the

fo rm

of

photographic

"

sketches"
5

frames. 1 6

that
The

defendants pub l ished those twenty-two s k etches in a book c r i t i c i z i n g
the Warren Commission ' s analysis a n d report. Defendants c la imed
that they needed the sketches to effec t i v e l y d emonstrate the book's
alternate analysis of the assassination and that the public i n terest i n
having informat ion o n t he assassination justi fied the l i mi ted use of
sketches. The district court reviewed t h e common law doctri n e o f fair
use. including quotations from Folsom and Rosemont, as wel l as the
then-current copyright revision b i l l s in the H ouse of Representatives
and the Senate that contained a statutory fa i r use provision . 1 66 I n
considering "good faith and fair dea l i ng" on t h e part of de fendants,
which the court found to be an i m portan t clement of fair use. the court
noted that "wh i l e hope by a defendant for commercial gain is not a
significant factor in this Circuit. there is a strong point for de fendants
in their offer to surrender to L i fe a l l p ro fi ts o f Associates from the
7
Book as royal ty paymcnt."16 The court ' s i nterest in the commercial
nature of the use related to its assessment o f the defenda n t ' s good
faith.

The

court

was

not

making

a

separate judgment

that

a

commercial use should be viewed as having an i nherently lower value
than a noncom merc i a l use, either with i n copyright or in the p u b l i c ' s
interest in dissemination o f speech o r in formation.
Ultimately, the court found that the balance of concerns w i t h i n
the fair use analysis favored the defendants. I n so doing. t h e court
relied heavily on the "public interest in h av i ng the ful lest in formation

availa b le on the murder of President Kennedy." 1 6K This public i n terest
in

disseminat ion

of

i nformation

i n c l uded

the

dissem ination

of

plainti ff's copyrighted expression, even though "doubtless t h e t heory
could be explai ned w i t h sketches [that were l ess complete and were

of informa1ion about Hughes because he preferred to avoid publicily. Id. For this reason, lhe
concurring judges viewed 1he case as signi ficanlly invested with free speech concerns.
165.

See Time. Inc.

\'.

Bernard Geis Assocs

..

293 F. Supp. 1 30, 1 39 (S.D. N . Y . 1 968). I n

Iola!, lhc Zapruder fi l m contained 41<0 frames. 1 40 showing l h e immediate events surrounding
the a.�sassinalion and 40 directly pertinent to the shols that were fired. See id. at 1 33.
166.

See id.

at

1 4 5 . For further discussion of the copyright revision process and the h i slory

of lhc fair use pro\·ision. sec supra Pan 1 1 1.D.
1 67.

Id.

1 6R.

Id.

a1

1 46.
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not true copies] . " 1 69 In addition, the court found littl e l ikel ihood o f
inj ury to the p laintiffs market for its work because p l aintiff did not
sell copies of the Zapruder pictures and the effect of d e fendant ' s use
on plaintiff s future proj ects using the pictures was specu lative. 1 70
Writing soon after the Rosemont and Bernard Geis deci sions.
Melville B. N immer criticized both deci sions for fa i l i n g to account
for free speech concerns separate and apart from the standard fair use
analysis. While he found Rosemont to b e wrong ly dec i ded al together,
he faulted the Bernard Geis analysis w i t hout disputing the conclusion
of noninfringement . 1 7 1

In

comment i n g

upon

the

Bernard

Geis

opinion, Nimmer argued that there is a ••grave danger" in fail ing to
distinguish copyright doctrines from First Amendment c oncerns:

[A]

grave danger to copyright may l i e i n the failure to d i stingu is h

between the statutory privilege known as fair use and an emerging

constitutional

limitation

on

copyrig h t

contained

in

the

first

amendment. The scope and extent o f fair use fal l s within the
discretion o f the Congress . The limitations of the first amendment
are imposed upon Congress itself. Fair use, when properly app l i ed,
is l i m ited to copying by others wh i c h does not materi a l l y impair
the

marketabil ity

of the

work

which

is

copied.

The

first

amendment privi lege, when appropri ate, may be invoked despite
the fact that the marketabi l ity o f the copied work
.
.
72
1mpa1re d . 1

Nimmer

argued

that fair use,

expression, i s entirely separate
which he

saw

as concerned

which
from

might

i s thereby

excuse

the

use o f

First Amendment i nterests,

primari l y with

ideas. 1 73

U nder his

analysi s , if ideas can be expressed in a second author' s own words or
own form of expression, the First A m e n dment cannot excuse the use,
even if fair use does. 1 74

Nimmer distinguished between the Bernard Geis case i n which
,
he thought the First Amendm ent alone s upported exonera t ion of the
use of the frames of the Zaprud er fi l m , from the Rosem ont case, n
i

which he though t the First Amend ment would not excuse
the use of
.
.
th e cop1ed expre ssion. 1 75 And on the R osemont facts
a s found by the
1 69.

Id.

1 70.

Id.

171.

See N immer, supra note 6.

1 72.

Id. at 1 200-0 I .

1 73 .

Id. at 1 20 1 -04.

1 74.

Id. at 1 20 3 .

1 75.

Id. a t 1 202. A 1 975 article
cont ainin g exten sive c o mmentar
y on the then-current
status of fair use essentially concurred
with N .•mrne r as to Rosemont
and , to a lesser degree.
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district court, he reasoned that fair use should not have applied either.
In his view, the freedom of use of the ideas and facts underlying the
magazine
1 6
protection for speech interests. 7
material copied

from

the

articles

provided

sufficient

Nimmer argued in part that while the First Amendment might
demand that defendants be free to use copyright-protected expression
in some instances, that

freedom should not i nclude a complete

freedom from royalty payments . 1 77 In h i s view, a compulsory license,
rather than free use, should be available i n what h e thought were the
relatively rare instances of First Amendment protection for use of
expression. 1 78 And although N i mmer steadfastly argued that "[n]either
the first amendment per se, nor the speech interests which underlie it,
justify in the name of education or culture the expropriation of
authorship," he also acknowledged that the
appetite

for

education

and

culture,"

along

"public ' s increasing
with

technological

advances, "requires a constant rethinking of the place of copyright
and the proper scope of the first amendment within our burgeoning
society." 1 79
Nimmer's analysis in

1 970 of the proper role of the First

Amendment as applied to a claim of copyright infringement - that is,
a

separate and occasional restraint on copyright claims, rather than a

consideration to be factored into the fair use doctrine - stands in
contrast to the Court's recent assertions on the issue . 1 80 It also stands
apart from the views expressed the same year by Paul Goldstein, who
avoided complete exoneration of infringing uses of expression when
defended via the First Amendment, yet approved of fair use as the

Bernard Geis. See Harvey S. Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States: Photocopying, Copyright. and the Judicial Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 355,
387-89 ( 1 975) (arguing that both the maj ority and concurring opinions in Rosemont "raised the
[fair use) issue to unnecessary dimensions" by referencing the public interest (either via the
Copyright C la use or the First Amendment) and asserting that the re levant interests in both
Rosemont and Bernard Geis could be satisfactorily resolved by reference to the idea-expression
dichotomy).
1 76.
In his analysis of the interplay of copyright and the First Amendment, Nimmer
concl uded that copyright would, in most instances, stand clear of true interference with the
freedom of speech. He did not rely on the idea-expression distinction alone. Instead, he found

that copyright's limited term [at the time, the initial statutory term was 28 years with the option
of another 28-year renewal term] and "the greater public good in the copyright encouragement
of creative works" combined with the idea-expression distinction to excuse copyright's burden
on speec h except in rare cases. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1 192, 1 193-1200.
1 7 7.

Id. at I I 99- 1 200.

1 78.

Id.

179.

Id. at 1 204.

1 80.

See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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means for accommodating speech interests. 1 8 1 He noted that using fair
use to excuse "otherwise infringing uses is an explicit objective of the
[copyright] law and rests upon a thoroughly principled basis [namely,
the pub l i c interest]. Sanction of the fair use defense - which accredits
the public interest in access to didactic expression - recognizes the
alleged infringer's standing to assert this public intercst . " 1 x�
N immer and Goldstein disagreed on the re lative scope and
frequency of a First-Amendment-protected public interest in the use
of copyright-protected

expression.

They

also

disagreed

on

the

appropriateness of using fair use to v indicate that p ublic interest.
They did agree, at least i mplicitly, that commercial use was irrelevant
to a fair use or F irst Amendment analysis within copyright. Neither
scholar

referenced

commercial

versus

noncommerc ial

uses

of

expression i n his study of fair use. And neither scho l ar lim ited his
analysis

of the

validity

of a

F i rst

Amendment-public

i nterest

copyright defense to noncommerc i a l contexts.
D. Codification of Fair Use in the 1 9 76 Act
In 1 976, Congress codified the j udicial doctrine of fair use in
1 3
section I 0 7 of the Copyright Act. 8 Congress repeatedly asserted that
I 0 7 simply restated the current judicial doctrine with no

section
changes,

neither narrowing

nor

enlarging

it.

1 84

Congress

also

intended for courts to continue their development of the fair use
doctrine. 1 85 Operating i n the wake of the Rosemont and Bernard Geis
decisions and the Goldstein and Nimmer articles, one would expect
Congress to have addressed how free speech i nterests should intersect
with section I 0 7, or in the alternative, to have stated that the issue
was appropriate for further judicial development. At the very least,

181.

Goldstein, supra note 6.

1 82.

Id. at W56 (emphasis added). But even Goldstein, while placing s i gnificant weight on
.

the fau use

�

octnne m accommodating the public interest, emphasized that the idea-expression
d1st1 nct1on . constitutes a more elastic application of the fair use motive;
the rules of the
.
ongmality reqms1te and of the idea-expres sion distinction are uniquely
just i fied by the public
interest that ideas be hberated from monopoly constraint. " Id.

1 83.

Copyright Act, Pub. L. No . 94-553, § I 07, 90 Stat. 2541 ( 1 976)
(C o d I· tiI C d at 1 7 u . s.c

§ 107 (2000)).

1 84.
"Section 1 07 is intended to restate the present judicial
doctrine of fair use not to
'
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H . R . REP. No.
94- 1 476, at 66 ( 1 976); S. R EP. No.
94-473, at 62 ( 1 5); H .R. REP . No. 89-22 3 7, at 6 1 ( 1 966).
H . R. REP. No. 9 0- 8 3 , at 3 1 ( 1 967)
.
.
(the cod1ticat1on had no purpose of either freezing or
changing the doctrine")" 1 22 CONG REC
3 1 44 (I 76) (the proposed language was "a restatement of this
judicia lly deve oped doctri e . .
( not1 en arge[ d] or change(d] m any way").

�:

�

1 85.

i

See, e.g. , H . R . REP. No. 94- 1 476, at 66; S.
REP. No. 94-47 3, at 62.

�

:
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one would expect Congress or other part1c1pants in the revision
process to have discussed free speech and the First Amendment in the
debates or negotiations surrounding the codifi cation of the fair use
doctrine. But one would be very wrong.
The process of revising the Copyright A c t began in earnest as
early as

1 955,

when Congress authorized the Register of Copyrights

to supervise and conduct a multi-year study of necessary and
1 86
advisable revisions to the law.
At the time, United States copyright

law was a slightly modified version of the 1 909 Copyright Act. 1 87 The
Register's

report

served

as

the

starting

p oint

for

organized

Congressional action toward what became the Copyright Act of

1 9 76. 188

Voluminous transcripts and reports documenting the negotiations
and deliberations of the

1 960s

regarding rev i sion of the c o pyright

laws exist in the legislative history.

Partic i pants in the process

debated fair use at length, but no mention o f the First Amendment or
1 89
free speech in those fair use debates can b e found.
The fair use
deliberations before

1 965

centered upon whether the new act should

include any express mention of fair use (and if so how extens i ve) o r
whether the new act should leave fair u s e entirely to the discretion o f
1 90
These initial deliberations
i t then resided.

the courts, where

occurred before Rosemont, Bernard Geis, and the scholarly interest o f

1 86.

H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2 .

See S. REP. No. 94-4 7 3 , at 47 ( 1 975); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2 ( 1 967); STAFF OF s.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2 D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES
1 87.

PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF TH E COMM.

ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY I , at I (Comm. Print 1 960); 1 22 CONG. R EC. 3 1 97 9 ( 1 976).
1 88.
1 89.

See H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2.

See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW

REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 1 6-20, 272-73, 29 1 -300, 3 1 4 - 1 6, 320, 33 1 -32, 350, 3 5 9-6 1 ,
365-69, 374, 379-80, 395-96, 4 1 3 , 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1 964) (containing transcript of

advisory panel's discussion of fair use and written comments related to fair use); STAFF OF H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 3 :
PRELIMINA RY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMM E NTS

ON THE DRAFT 6, 1 5 8-77, 372, 3 75-76, 400, 409, 4 1 7 , 443 (Comm. Print 1 964) (containing
proposed fa ir use provision, transcript of advisory panel ' s discussion of fair use, and written
com ments related to fair use, including commentary by Melville Nimmer); STAFF OF H. COMM.
ON THE J UDICIARY, 87TH CONG., l ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U . S . COPYRIGHT LAW 24-25
(Comm . Print 1 96 1 ) (containing Register's comments on fair use); STAFF OF S. COM M . ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION : STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMM. ON PATENT S, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS O F T H E COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
STUDY 14, at 1 -34 (Comm. Print 1 960) (reprinting Alan Latman ' s study on fair use, prepared at
the request of the Comm ittee).
1 90.

See sources cited supra note 1 89.

[ Vol. 24

SAN TA CLARA COM PUTE R & HIGH TECH . L . J .

72

the

the
1 970s in the intersection of copyr ight and free speec h. Thus,

tanda ble.
lack of Congr ession al attenti on to the issue is unders
and revisions
By 1 965, the several years o f negotiations, dra fts,
ght revision
allowed Congr ess to consider a relativ ely thorough copyri
191
The House Comm ittee on the J udiciary held
bill, H . R. 434 7 .
amount
hearing s and conducted extensi ve deliberations on the bill. No
the
of reading on or between the l ines elicits even a hint that

Commit tee ' s hearings and delibera tions on the 1 965 bill, or any
parallel activity i n the Senate, i nvolved consider ation o f First
1 9�
If
Amendm ent issues in connectio n with the doctrine o f fair usc.
thought w a s given by any member o f Congress, o r a n y participant in
the relevant discussions or negotiation s, to the interplay of free speech
and fair use, that thought was not recorded for posterity.

H.R. 4347, as introduced, briefly addressed fair use in section
1 07: "the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an i nfringement of
1 93
Following testimony and deliberation on the bill, the
copyright."
Committee revised section

1 0 7 to i n clude the following factors for

courts to consider, which factors had previously been part of a short
1 94
lived 1 964 proposal:
( 1 ) the purpose and character o f the use; (2) the nature o f the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4)

r

the

effect of the use u on the potential market for or va lue of the

copyrighted wo rk . 1

9

That four-factored version of section l 07 survived unchanged
through almost a decade of additional negotiations, hearings, and
deliberations. Through the entirety of the record from 1 965 to 1 976,

191.

See H . R. 4347, 89th Cong. ( 1 st Sess. 1 96 5 ) .

See S. REP. No. 90- 1 1 68, at 8 ( 1 968) (reporting on subcommittee hearings on S . 597.
which was substanti l l
identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the House
_
Co m1ttee on the Jud1c1ary); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 4, 29-37 ( 1 967) (reporting
on H . R. 25 1 2 ,
1 92.

� �

'.11

� �

which was substanti l l
identical to H.R. 4 3 4 7 as amended and reported by t h e House
_
Comm1tt e on the ud1c1ary); H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 3 1 -3 3 , 58-66,
1 94 ( 1 96 6 ) (reporting
on committee hearings on H.R. 4347 and amending the bill). Comments
on H R 24 1 2 which
was su s antially identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported
by the Hous
omm ttee on
the Jud1c1ary, can be found at 1 1 4 CONG . REC. I 0346 ( 1 968);
I I 3 CONG. REC. 850 I , 858 7 ,
8639, 8996-97 , 90 1 9, 902 1 ( I 967). See also I 1 2 CONG REC
9409 24065 ( 1 966) ( summarizing
and commen ting on H . R . 4347 as amended by subcomm ittee).
1 93.
H.R. 4347 § 1 07; H.R. REP. No. 89-223 7, at 59.

:

�

��

�C

i

·

·

.

·

·

,

H.R. 1 I 94 7, 88th Cong. (2d Sess. 1 964 ) .
See H . R. 4347 § 1 07· H R R E P No 90- 8 ,
3 at 2 9-3 0 (discussin g the amendments
made to H.R. 4347 by the Committee on the Judicia
ry during the 89th Congre ss); H . R. REP. No.
_
89-2237, at 5, 3 1 (reporting
the amended versi on of H .R. 4347)
.
1 94.

1 95.

•

·

·

·

·
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there is no discussion of the First Amendment or free speech in the
context of fair use. 1 96 So even after Rosemont and Bernard Geis as
'
well as the articles by N i mmer and Goldstein, the fair use-free speech

issue did not arise in connection with section 1 07 .

Much o f the fair use debate throughout the revision process

centered upon the education lobby' s demand for a blanket exemption
from copyright liability for educational uses, including reproduction
for classroom use. 1 97 That lobbying appears to have had some effect.
Shortly before the House voted on the 1 976 Act in late September
1 976, the long-unchanged fair use factors were modified by new
language added to the first factor in the House amendments reported
on September

3,

1 9 76.

The

House

amendments

September 3, 1 976 stated the first fair use factor as:

reported

"( 1 )

on

the purpose

and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
.
.
"I 8
.
commercia1 nature or is
fior nonpro fiit e ducatlonaI purposes. 9 Th e
House Report accompanying the September 1 97 6 House amendments

to the Senate bill states that the change was "an express recognition
that, as under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character
of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and

196 . See H.R. R E P. No. 94- 1 73 3 , at 7, 70 ( 1 976); H.R. REP. No. 94- 1476, at 5, 65-74, 202
( 1 976); s. R EP. No. 94-473, at 5, 6 1 -67 ( 1 975); s. R EP . No. 94-92, at 7 ( 1 975); s. REP. No. 93-

1 135, at 7-8 ( 1974); S. RE P . No. 93-983, at I 0- 1 1 , 1 1 5- 1 20 ( 1 974); S. REP. No. 9 1 - 1 2 1 9, at 5
( 1 970); S. REP. No. 9 1 -5 1 9, at 8-9 ( 1 969); s. REP. No. 90- 1 1 68, at 8; H .R. REP. No. 90-83, at 4,
29- 37; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 3 1 -33, 58-66, 1 94 ; 1 22 CONG. REC. 28 1 7, 2 834, 3 1 44,

3 83 5, 3843 , 26234, 3 1 980-8 1 , 3 1 983, 3 1 986-89 ( 1 976); 1 20 CONG. REC. 224 1 1 , 30342, 3 0 3 6 1 ,
30402, 30500 ( 1 974); 1 1 9 CONG. REC. 9389 ( 1 973); 1 1 4 CONG. REC. 1 0346 ( 1 968); 1 1 3 CONG .

REC. 8501 , 8587, 8639, 8996-97, 90 1 9 , 902 1 ( 1 967); 1 1 2 CONG. REC. 9409, 24065 ( 1 966). Cf

H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 254 (mentioning the First Amendment right of freedom of speech, but
only in the context of copyright regulations related to community antenna television (comments
of Rep. Basil L. Whitener)).

1 97.

See, e.g., H . R. REP. No. 94-1 733, at 70; H . R . REP. NO . 94- 1 476, at 65-72; S. REP. No.

93 - 1 1 35, at 7; S. REP. No. 93-983, at I 1 5-20; s. REP. No. 9 1 -5 1 9, at 8; H . R. REP. No. 90-83, at

29-37; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5 8-66; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,

2o SESs., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON

PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REV I SE D U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 1 9-20, 3 3 1 , 350, 359-6 1 , 365-69,

376-80, 4 1 3 , 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1 964); 1 20 CONG. REC. 30402 ( 1 974).

198.
Compare S. 2 2 , 94th Cong. § 1 0 7 ( 1 975) (text of section 107 before September 3 ,
197 6 amendment), and 1 22 CONG. REC. 3843 (providing the text o f section 1 07 within S.22, as
it existed on February 1 9, 1 976), and S. REP. No. 94-473, a t 5, 62 ( 1 975) (containing the

Judiciary Com mittee's report on S. 22 and including an unamended section I 07), with H .R. REP.
No. 94- 1 733, at 70 ( 1 976) (Conf. Rep.) (describing and adopting the House amendments to
section 107 in the conference version of S. 22), and H R. REP. No. 94- 1 4 76, at 5, 66 ( 1 976)
.
(adding the phrase "including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes" to the first factor and injecting the parenthetical phrase "(includ ng
multiple copies for classroom use)" after the word "teaching" i n the first paragraph o f section

�

1 07).
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should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions." 1

99

No further explanation or substantiation of that statement e x ists in the
record. The

conference report does

not provide any

accepting the amendment as part of the conference bill.

200

reason

for

The House

Report continued to characterize the overall intent behind the section
1 07 fair use provision as a restatement of the current j ud i c i a l doctrine
20 1
The conference b i l l passed both the H ouse and

- with no changes.

the Senate on September 30,

1 9 76, and President Ford si gned it

shortly thereafter. The four factors in section 1 07 rema i n unchanged
202
today.
E. The Ef
fect of Codification
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress d i d not i ntend
for the 1 9 76 Act to alter the fai r use doctrine. The late addition of
language

regarding

commerc ial

and

nonprofit

educational

uses

frustrated that intent. The fact is that Congress did alter the fair use
20
doctrine in 1 9 76. 3 Moreover, even apart from the spec i fi c language
chosen for the statute, the very codi fication of fair use wrought its
own alteration o f the previous l y organic doctrine. The l egis lative
history indicates that Congress desi red for j udicial deve l o p ment of
204
fair use to continue as it had before the 1 9 76 Act.
Nevertheless,

1 99. H.R. REP. No. 94-1 476, at 66. As characterized by a later commentator. the addition
of the language �as n?nsubstantive, and instead "a poli tical sop to an unhappy interest group.
[throug reco �mt1on]
m the statute itself that their type of use was one that might be fair in
appropriate c1 �cumstanc es." PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 422; William F. Patry & Shira
_
Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parodi·.
. 1 1 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 667, 678-79 ( 1 992).

�

200.
20 1 .
text .
2 2·

See H.R. REP. No.

94- 1 733 at 70.

See H . R . REP. No ·

94- 1 476 at 66 . See also supra notes 1 84- 1 85 and accompanyi ng
·

�gh the preamble and four factors of section 1 07 have not changed, the section
� ��Altho
herwise amended since the 1 976 enactment. In 1 990, with the addition of section
� �: e Co�ynght Act, which added certai n moral rights for works of visual art the
��;:n�e 1� s:c�o� I 06 in the first sentence was expanded to include
bo;h sections I O� and

ha e
IO A

ee u
o. I O l -650, § 607, 1 04 Stat. 5 1 3 2 ( 1 990). And in 1 99"' Congress added the
· unpublished shall
I ast sentence·· "The fact that a work is
not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
.
.
fim d'mg is made upon consideration of all the above factors " Pub
· L · No · I 0., 49., 1 06 stat.
·
3 1 45 ( 1 992).
·

·

·

-

·

·

--

-·

.
.
203. Accord PATRY supra note 1 1 8 at 4 1 4 A s fiurther detailed
in this article. in addition
to focusing attention on commerc.1a 1 versus nonprofi t educat'
iona 1 purposes . section l 07 made
consideration of the four l isted f;actors man d atory. fd.
.

'

·

'

204.

See H.R. REP. No.

94- 1476, at 66 ( 1 976); S . REP. No. 94-473. at 62 ( 1 975).
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subsequent development in the courts has not been robust, to the
205
extent it has occurred at a l I .
We can see that the four factors in section 1 07 echo the p assage
from Folsom and later cases in some ways, although not in all
206
Unlike J ustice Story's opinion in Folsom, section 107
2 1
makes consideration of the li sted factors mandatory. 0 In that regard,
particulars.

Congress

should

have

recalled

Justice

Story' s

express

characterization of fair use as a doctrine wherein no "general
2 8
pri nciples applicable to a l l cases" could be delineated. 0 By codifying
mandatory factors for a fair use analysis, C ongress communicated to
the courts that general principles of fair use applicable to all cases
exist and that the courts are required to apply those principles t o all
cases. Despite its stated intentions not to c h ange the doctrine and not
to hinder its judicial development and flexibi l i ty, Congress did just
that in 1 976.
Particularly disturbing for the alleged flexibility of fair use for
defendants raising First Amendment concerns i s the shi ft in analysis
wrought by the addition o f "use . . . of a commercial nature" as a
specific consideration for the courts. The added language m akes
commercial use a sub-factor within purpose and character of a use.

205.

Accord Litman, supra note 144, at 899 ("A copyright scheme needs flexibility, and

the 1976 Act reposes most of that flexibility in its fair use provision. The Court's refonnulation
of fair use has restricted its avai labil ity for commerc i a l uses, removed its flexibility and ti lted
the balance between owners and users to the copyright owners' advantage.").
206.

Compare 1 7 U .S.C. § I 07 (2000) (providing four nonexcl usive factors to consider i n

evaluating a claim o f non i nfringing fair use, including these three: "the purpose and character o f
the use, . . . the amount a n d substantial ity o f the portion used in relation t o the copyrighted work
as a whole[,] and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."), with Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1 84 1 ) (No. 4,90 I ) :
[W)e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.
Willia m Patry characterizes the first statutory fair use factor as Folsom 's first factor "sli ghtly
rephrased." PATRY, supra note 1 1 8, at 24. On the other hand, Ray Patterson argued that "the
purpose and character of the use" did not arise from Justice Story' s "the nature and objects o f
the selections made," contrary t o assertions o f that i l k b y Patry a n d others. Patterson, supra note

14, at 43 n. 1 4 1 . Patterson advocated instead for an analysis o f "nature and objects of the
selections" as referring to the portions of the original work selected for use by the defendant,
rather than the use of those portions within defendant's new work. Id.
207.
Despite the fact that section 1 07 makes the l i s t of factors nonexclusive, few opinions
include considerati ons beyond those l isted, and the i nterpretati o n and application o f the isted
factors is quite literal and rather i n flexible. One additional factor considered in some cases t s the
presence or absence of good faith by defendant. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 1 I 8, at 4 1 5 n. 1 4
(listing cases) .

�

208.

Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
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st fair use in light of its
Comm ercia l ity appears to weig h again
Th i s
p u rpose s.
educa tion a l
"nonp rofit
with
juxtap os1t1o n
.
.
mte:e sts . served by an
unex p l ained financ ial catego rizati on o f th
l us 1 o n I ll the expres s
allege dly fai r use, elevated as it is by m c
111orc- pn�hk m<�t1c
langua ge of the statute , has posed an everyears l o l lowmg
contrad iction with First Amend ment i nterest s owr t h e

�

its codification.

Section l 07 reflects an attempt to de fine, a l beit on a case-by

case basis, certain uses that are simply not to be incl uded within the
copyright owner's contro l (including re prod u c tio n s

,

pe rfo rma n c es ,

and a l l other uses implicated by the exc lus ive ri gh ts grantcd to a
copyright owner) . In light o f C ongress ' s intent to leave t he doctrine
unchanged and allow continued j ud i cial developme n t . the a tt c mpt to
define fa i r use in the Copyright A c t may have been misguided.
Regardless of whether the attempt was misguided as a general matter.
it is c lear that Congress h arbored no particular

i nten t either to

maintain or to modify the doctrine i n light of copyright ' s potential
conflict w ith free speech interests.

Neither C ongress nor the industry members partic ipating in the
addition of section l 07 to the C opyright Act ever c onsidered the
209
i ntersection of fair use and freedom of speech .
A careful study of

the fair-use-related portions o f the v o l uminous legisl ative history of

the l 976 Copyright Act reveal s no m ention of the Fi rst Amendment
or the freedom of speech. C ongress never intended section I 07 to

serve as a safety valve for First A mendment concerns . T he previous

jurisprudence of fair use simi l arly developed large l y independent of
.
.
210
.
Th us, o n e question
tiree speec h concerns.
remams w i t h respect to
the Court ' s reliance on fair use to v i ndicate free speech in terests -

namely w hether, despite the lack of a historical or structural purpose
to accommodate free speech, fa i r use does in fact operate w i th First
Amendment sensitivity .

209.
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS .. COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS A N D COM MENTS ON PRELIMINAR
Y DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 2 1 6-20, 272-73, 29 1 -300, 3
1 4- 1 6, 320, 3 3 1 -32. 3 50 . 359-6 1 .
365 69, 374, 3 9-80, 3 9 -96, 4 1 3, 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print
1 964) (containin g transcript of
�
.
advisory panel s discussion of fair use and written c o mments related
to fair use); STAFF OF H .
COMM. ON THE JUDICIAR Y, 87TH CONG., 2 D SES S . , COPYRIGH T
LAW REVIS ION : PART 3 :
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIG HT L A W A N D
DISCUSSI ONS A N D COMMENTS
ON THE DR FT 6, 1 5 8 7 , 372, 375-76, 400, 409 , 4 1 7 , 443
(Comm . Print 1 964) (containi ng
�
proposed fa1r use prov1s10 n, transcript of advisory pane l ' s
discussio n of fair use, and written
comments related to fair use, including commen tary by Melville
N immer) .
2 1 0.
See supra Part III.A-B.

;

�

�

?
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IV. MODERN FAIR USE DOCTRIN E AND FI RST AMENDMENT
INTERESTS
A. The Fair Use Factors

a_(Section

107

When we analyze the statutory embodiment of fair use for a First
Amendment purpose or First Amendment-sensitive result, we see that
the language of section I 07 does not respect, much less conform to,
First Amendment values. 2 1 1 In fact, while certain elements within the
analysis do not interfere with current First Amendment principles as
set forth by the Supreme Court, others elements actually contradict
those principles.
l . Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use factor instructs courts to consider "the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
co mmercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."2 1 2 The
language of this factor relates back to the first paragraph of section
1 07, which states broadly that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . .
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarsh ip, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright."2 1 3 This broad statement
is followed, in turn, by a requirement that a court consider all four o f
the listed fair use factors in making a fair use determination. 2 14 The
.

211.

Section I 07 of the Copyright Act provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections I 06 and I 06A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case i s a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include ( I ) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commerc ial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyri ghted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 1 07.
2 1 2.

1 7 U.S.C. § 1 07( 1 ).

213.

1 7 U.S.C. § 1 07 .

2 1 4.

Id.
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illustrative uses in the first paragraph provide courts with a non
exclusive list of examples of the types of purposes with positive fair
use value. The "such as" language i n dicates that add i t ional purposes
or uses o f other character may yet be fair; however, the purpose and
character inquiry remains overall an i nv estigation into why the second
use of the expressive material was made. If the inq u i ry into why the
expressive

material was

used

were

sufficiently

broad,

it

could

encompass uses for protected free speech purposes.
But the design of the first fair use factor opposes certain First
Amendment values, both by narrowing the courts' fi e l d of vision and
by improperly d iscriminating between uses of vary i ng purpose and
character. It disadvantages noncommercial speech that has a profit
motive by calling it use of a "commercial nature" and counterposing
that speech against speech for "non-profit educational purposes." All
judges, i ncluding the Justices o f the Supreme Court, i nterpret this
juxtaposition to mean that all for-profi t uses receive less respect under
215
the first factor, the purpose and character of the use.
I n disfavoring
all "commerc ial use" by using a pro fi t-motivated line for commercial
use,

this

factor

disfavors

most

works

of fiction,

biographies,

newspapers, news broadcasts, political fundraising uses, and even
scholarly works that are published and sold on the market. The First
Amendment does not disfavor these forms of speech; o n the contrary,
it provides them with full protection.
The F i rst Amendment does not tolerate discrimi nation against
speech simply because it is sold for monetary profit (or other reward
216
Simi larly, F i rst Amendment protection does not
to the seller).
diminish merely because a speaker has been paid to pri n t or otherwise
217
disseminate a message.
Current F i rst Amendment j urisprudence
does provide lesser protection to "commercial speech," as that term is

Courts no longer apply to profitable uses a firm presumption against fair use, but

2 1 5.

profit-seeking by th.e party alleging fair use sti ll weighs in favor of infringement. See Campbell
v. Ac ff-Ro�e �us1c, Inc., 5 1 0 U.S. 569, 583-85 ( t 994). In unambiguously rebuking the tower

�

courts

application of a legal presumption against commercial uses, the Campbell Court

observed that the presumption would "swallow nearly alt of the i llustrative uses" in the first
paragraph

�� section
.

I 07, which uses are set forth as the types of uses that may be fair, because

are generally conducted for profit in this country."' fd. at 584 (quoting Harper &
.
.
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 47 1 U.S. 539, 592 ( t 985) (Brennan, J . , dissenting))

those uses
2 1 6.

See, e.g., Smith v. California, 3 6 1 U.S. 1 47 , 1 50 ( 1 959) (books are fully protected

speech); Joseph Burstyn, Inc.

v.

Wilson, 343 U . S . 495, 5 0 1 ( 1 952) (motion p ictures); Breard

v.

Alexandria, 34 1 U .S . 622, 642 ( 1 95 1 ) ("We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not

put them ?eyond the protection of the First Amendment."). See also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counci l , Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 7 6 1 ( 1 976).
2 1 7.

See. e.g. , N . Y . Times Co.

v.

Sullivan. 3 7 6 U . S . 254, 265-66 ( 1 964).
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understood in the case law. As set forth in Part 11.B.2 above, the
Supreme Court's First Amendment "commercial speech" category is
much narrower than section I 07 's use "of a commercial nature·" i t
does not encompass all profit-motivated or profit-making speech.
With the first factor's focus upon profit, fair use disadvantages much
noncommercial but profit-related speech. Noncommercial not-for
profit speech is advantaged. The First Amendment does not
countenance such a divide.2 1 8
'

2. The Other Fair Use Factors
If the remainder of the fair use analysis included an express
balance and consideration of First Amendment interests, of course,
the difficulties presented by the first factor might be of little ultimate
consequence. After all, none of the factors are dispositive, and all are
to be considered. The problem is that while the remaining factors may
coordinate well with within copyright, i. e. , accommodating second
user creativity without overly damaging first-user reward, the
remaining factors do not contain any First Amendment sensitivity that
can salvage the damage done under the express language of the first
factor.
The second fair use factor, which directs a court to consider "the
nature of the copyrighted work,"2 1 9 favors fictional, creative works
over non-fiction, factual works. This means that a fictional work is
less likely to be found to have been fair l y used than a factual work, all
other considerations being equal. This factor re-emphasizes the idea
expression distinction within copyright2 20 and copyright' s lack of
protection for facts even when those facts are contained within
copyright-protected expression.22 1 It does not speak to any First
Amendment issue outside the idea-expression and fact-expression
distinctions. 22 2
2 1 8.

See Va. Stale Bd. , 425 U.S. at 76 1 . See also supra Part 1 1 . 8.2.

2 1 9.

17 U.S.C. § 1 07(2) (2000).

220.

See 17 U.S.C. § 1 02(b) (2000).

22 1 .

See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v . Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U . S . 340 ( 1 99 1 ).

222. Insofar as we believe in the Constitutio nal clause 's statement that copyright i s
designed to promote learning, i t might seem that promotion o f learning is indeed enhanced by
making factual works "easier" to fairly use. At the same time, if we think of our copyright
system as a utilitarian-reward system, the second fair use factor actually discourages (in a
relative sense) the creation of idea-factual works in favor of the creation of fictional, creative
works in l ight of the greater protection of fictional-creative works by virtue of their tr�atm�nt
within fair use. As such, the second factor may in fact contravene the system of ut1iltana n
rewards intended to enhance learning, if indeed learning is more enhanced by i dea-factual

dissemination than by creative dissemination.
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The third fair use factor is "the amount and substantial ity of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole ... � � .i

! he

qualitative "value" of the expressi o n to the origi a l work recc1v � s
�
consideration a long with the quantitative amount.--4 I n general. this

provides the creator of a second work some li mited l eeway to use

a

small amount o f expression from a c o pyright-protected work as long
as the use does not take the core o r heart of the original work. In
material

supports

an

amount of

to use a limi ted

copyright pol icy terms, the abi l ity
copyrighted

overall

increase

in

authorial

productivity while attempting to avoid the interference with monetary
and non-monetary rewards to copyrig h t owners that might occur with
extensive uses of expressive materi a l . This overa l l increase in creat ive
production is accomplished by providing comfort and protection for
some o f the appropriate borrowing and cross-fert i l ization that is
necessary for a new work.
W h i l e a c lear connection to internal copyright pol icy exists, there
is no operative connection between t h e third factor a n d free speech.
Within First Amendment jurisprudence, the amount of expression a
speaker projects i s irrelevant. Movies and novels have been protected
just as much as Cohen ' s brief statement, "Fuck the Dra ft."225 I do not
argue that the third fair use factor rises t o the level of v i o l ating a F irst
Amendment principle, as I do w i t h t h e first factor. N o n ethel ess, the
of

analysis

quantity

and

does

quality

not

possess

any

First

Amendment benefits that ame l i o rate the damage done under the first
factor.
The final fa i r use factor, the effect of the use on t h e value of or
the market for the copyrighted work,

226

clearly attempts to vindicate

copyright' s internal purpose o f motivating production by providing
for authorial reward. The factor tries to avoid significant interference
with the reward that is "due" the auth o r under our system, even while
tolerating

insigni ficant interferences.

In

contrast,

w h en

the

First

Amendment is at stake, we never ask what the finan c i a l effect was
upon the target of speech or on competing speech being di sseminated
by others. Money i s not the issue. The o n l y time that t h e commercial
purpose o f particular speech matters i n today' s First Amendment

223.
224.

17 U . S . C .

§

I 07(3).

See H arper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

v . Nation Enters., 4 71 U.S. 5
3 9 , 564-66 ( 1 9 8 5).
California, 403 U.S. 1 5 ( 1 97 1 ) with Smith v
. Californ ia, 3 6 1 U .S.
1 7, 1 50 ( 1 959) (books) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. W i lson, 343 U . S. 495,
50 I ( 1 95 2 ) (motion
pictures).

�

225.

Compare Cohen

226.

1 7 u.s.c. § 1 07(4).

v.
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doctrine is when the speech is deemed t o be "commercial speech . "227
As explained above in Part 1 1 . 8 . 2 , "co mmercial speech" as seen
through a First Amendment lens is a narrow category that excludes
many forms of profit-oriented speech.228 As with the previous factor,
the analysis does not expressly encroach upon First Amendment
values. The calculus in the fourth factor again demonstrates, h o wever,
that the current statutory fair use factors are not actually designed or
tailored to accommodate F irst Amendment concerns in any particular

way.

B. The Supreme Court 's Fair Use A nalysis

The history o f fair use through 1 976 and the foregoing analysis
of the statutory factors demonstrate, and in some respects explain, the
lack of express sensitivity to the First Amendment in the early
doctrine and in the statute. The history and statutory language cannot,
on the other hand, explain the Court ' s continued reliance on section
1 07 as a savior o f free speech.229 The Court has not explained its
reliance, either, although it has heard four cases including a
signi fi cant fair use component since the 1 9 7 6 Act took effect. 23 0
Moreover,

the

Supreme

Court' s j udicial

gloss

on

the

speech

insensitive fair use analysis only obliquely relates to modem First

Amendment principles.

l . Sony Corp. o f America v. Universal C ity Studios, Inc.

I n So ny Corp. of A merica

2

3 1 the
2
Co urt 's first fair use decis ion,23 the parties d isputed the fair or unfair
nature of the use of video tape recorders by individuals to record
v.

Universal City Studios, Jnc. ,

copy right-protected televis ion shows for later viewing. The Court
referred to this individual recording as "time-sh ifting. "233 Although

the Court would later "correct" lower court i nterpretation of Sony as

227.
228.
229.
23 0.

See supra Part 1 1 .B.2.

Id.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 5 3 7 U.S. 1 87, 2 2 1 (2003); Harper & Row, 4 7 1 U . S . at 560.
See Campbe l l v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0 U.S. 569 ( 1 994); Stewart v. Abend, 495

U.S. 207 ( 1 990); Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 539; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
I nc. , 464 U.S. 4 1 7 ( 1 984).
23 1 .

Sony Corp. , 464 U.S. at 4 1 7 .
The Court had heard two previous cases involving fair use, but each time the Court
was equally divided and issued no opinion. See Will iams & W i l kins Co. v. United States, 420
232.

U.S . 37 6 ( 1 975) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally divided Court 487 F.2d 1 345 (Ct. C l . 1 973);
Col umbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew 's Inc., 356 U.S. 4 3 ( 1 958) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally

divided Court Ben y v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 5 3 2 (9th Cir. 1 956).
n
233 .
Sony Corp., 464 U . S . at 42 1 .
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providing for a presumption of unfair use when a defendant engaged
234
in an allegedly infringing use for profit,
a fair reading of the case
does emphasize the commerciality, or profit-ori ented nature of a
235
The noncommercial n ature o f consumer time-shi fting favored

use.

Sony's fair use defense of the practice of time-sh ifting on both the
23
first and fourth factors. 6
W ith respect to the first fair use factor, the Court understood that
the statutory language required consideration of the " ' commercial or
nonprofit character of an activity, "' although the detennination on
37
that point would not be conclusive. 2 The Court then stated,
If the Betamax [the video tape recorder in question] were used to
make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use
would presumptively be unfair.

The

contrary presumption

is

appropriate here, however, because the District Court ' s fi ndings
plainly estab lish that time-shifting for private home use must be

.

c h aractenzed as a noncommercia1 , n onprofi1t act1v1ty.
.

.

.

238

Th e analysis of the first fair use factor ended there . The Court

discussed no other aspect of the purpose and character of the use.

With respect to the second factor, the Court without elaboration
seemed

to

conclude

that

the

nature

of televised

copyrighted

audiovisual works favored fair use, despite the fact that those works
3
can be either factual or fictional or anywhere in between. 2 9 And
although time-shifting involved the recording of entire works, the
Court found that because the copyright owners allowed the initial
viewing to occur free of charge, the third factor also d i d not weigh
f: .
.
0
against air use. 2 4 As to the fourth factor, effect upon the market for
or value of the work, the Court concluded that it did not prevent a
finding of fair use because the p laintiff copyright o wners had not
provided sufficient evidence to prove that time-shiftin g was either

234.

See infra Part IV.8.4

235.
236.

See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448-5 1 .

237.
238.

Id. at 448-49 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94- 1 476 ( 1 976)).

Id.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 449-50:

239.

Moreover, when one considers the nature o f a
televised copyrighted audiovi sual
ork, see 17 U.S.C. § 1 07(2) 0 982 ed.), and that
t i me-shifting merely enables a
viewer to see such a work which he had been invited
to witness in its entirety free
of charge , the fact that the entire work is reprod
uced, see § l 07(3), does not have
its ordina ry effect of militating against a finding
o f fair use .

v.:

240.

Id.
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hannful at the time or would become harmful to the market fo r the
41
works if it became more widespread. 2
2 . Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v . Nation Enterprises
v.

In the Court' s next fair use case, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
42
analysis of the purp o s e and character of the

Nation Enterprises,2

alleged infringing use focused not only upon the commerciality o f
defendant's use, but also upon the defendan t ' s "stated purpose o f

scooping"

the

upcoming

publication

of

plaintiff s

work

and

defendant's knowing exploitation of a "purloined manuscript."243
Defendant Nation Enterprises published in

The Nation Magazine

qualitatively substantial excerpts from President Gerald Ford ' s soon
to-be-published autobiography, focusing largely upon Ford ' s pardon

of President Richard Nix on. The facts that the autobiograph y had not
yet been published and that The Nation had known its possession of
the pre-publication manuscript was unauthorized both w eighed
heavi ly i n the Court's decision ruling against the claim of fair use.2 44
The unpublished nature of the p laint i ff' s work weighed against fair
use not only under the first factor, but also under the second. The

Court held that "the scope of fair use i s narrower with respect to
unpublished works . . .

24 1 .

[because]

[t]he

right

of first publication

Id at 450-54. The Court expanded upon its view of the market-effects analysis as

ollows:
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying
for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to obtain
the rewards that Congress intended him to have.
demonstrable

effect

upon the potential

But a use that has no

market for,

or

the value

of,

the

copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to prote c t the author's incentive
to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.
is
of copyrighted material
Thus, although every commercial use
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to
the owner o f the copyright, noncommerc ial uses are a different matter. A

challenge to a noncommercial use requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widesprea d, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work
. What i s necessary is a showing
.

.

.

_

meaning fu l likelihood of future
harm exists. If the intended use is for commerc ial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed. But if i t is for a noncommercial purpose , the likelihood must be
by a preponde rance of the evidence that

some

demonstrated.

Id. at 450-5 1 .
242 .
243.
244.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v . Nation Enters., 4 7 1 U.S. 5 3 9 ( 1 985).

Id. at 562-6 3 .
Id
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encompasses not only the choice whether to publish a t all, but also t� c

choices o f when, where, and in what fonn first to publish a work. "24)

I n commenting upon the commercial or profit-oriented nature of
the defendant ' s use in its discussion of the first fair use factor, the
Court repeated its statement from Sony that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair explo itation" of the
copyright owner's rights. 246 It fol lowed that general statement with
this rationale: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not
whethe r the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from explo itation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price."2 47 In so doing, the Court appears
to have b lended the first and fourth factors to some degree, without
additional explanation.

The Court acknowledged that another aspect of the purpose and

character of the defendant's use was news reporting, but discounted

that purpose on the basis that The Nation had not merely reported
unprotected

i n formation

and

facts,

but

had

instead

made

an

unauthorized first publication o f Ford ' s copyrighted expression.248

The distinction between the use of facts and the use of expression
within the analysis of the purpose and character of the use echoes the
Court ' s earlier discussion in the case of some aspects of the interplay

of copyright a n d free speec h . The defendant had argued that First

Amendment principles, namely the public interest in the content and

manner of expression of Ford ' s memoirs , mandated a decision on fair

use opposite the Court' s general view that, in almost a l l instances, an
"author' s

right

to

control

the

first

public

appearance

of his

undisseminated expression wil l outweigh a claim of fair use. "249 In
responding to this argument, the Court emphasized the rol e of the
idea-expression

distinction

the

defendant's

as

the

m eans

within

theory

would

"expand

copyright

of

balancing free speech and an author ' s exclusive righ ts. According to
Court,

the

fai r

use

to

effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the
work of a public figure. "2 50 The court further stated:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied
in

245.

the

Copyright

Act's

distinction

Id. at 564.

246.

Id. at 562; Sony Corp., 464 U.S.

247.

Harper & Row, 4 7 1 U.S. at 562.

248.

Id. at 56 1 .

249.

Id. at 555-56.

250.

Id. at 557.

at

45 I .

between

copyrightable
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expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarsh ip and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see
no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what
25 1
amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.

While the Court did rely in part on "the latitude for scho l arship
and comment traditionally afforded by fair use," it relied primarily on
the idea-expression distinction to deny further expansion of the scope
of purpose and character of a use to accomplish a broader vision of
the role of free speech within fair use. 252 This limited view of the free
speech utility of fair use, considering primarily scholarship and
comment as traditionally fair uses of express ion, devitalized the role

of fair use as a protector of free speech.

The Court rejected the notion that the c ontent of the allegedly
infringed work - subj ect matter of great public interest - should
excuse an otherwise infringing use: "It is fundamentally at odds with
the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are
of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the maj or
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike."253 In
response to the Court's concern, I would argue that broadening the
vision of purpose and character of a use to include considerations
such as the value to the public of further dissemination of some
expression need not fully excuse any particular use. That broader
vision would only become one more factor in the overall fair use
balance. As the
disposi ti ve. 254

Court

has repeatedly

stated, no one

factor

is

One difficulty in the Court's ability or desire to use Harp er &
Row as the vehicle to either affirm or recreate fair use as an

embodiment of broad First Amendment values may have been that the
defendant sought to excuse a qualitatively substantial use of

expression, characterized by the District Court as "essentially the
heart of the book. "255 The qualitativ e value of the expressio n used

caused the third fair use factor to weigh heavily against a finding of
fair use. Similarly , the fourth factor also powerfully favored the
plai ntiff. Having charact erized the fourth factor as "undoubtedly the

25 1 .

Id at 560.

252.

Id. at 557-60.

25 3 .

Id. at 559.

254.

See

.S. 569 ' 577-78 ( 1 994); Harper &
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0
.
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 448
City
sal
Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer
( 1 984).

�

., 5 5 7 F. Supp. 1 067, 1 072 (S.D.N .Y.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters
1 983) (quoted in Harper & Row, 4 7 l U.S. at 565).
255.
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single most important element of fair use," the Court went on to

emphasize the actual effect of The Nat ion s use upon the plaintiffs
arrangement with Time Magazine for pre-publication serialization. � 51'
'

Referring

to

the article

by

defendant,

Time had

cance l led the

serialization and refused to pay the full amount that would have been

due to p l aintiff under the arrangement. According to the Court, this
was "clear-cut evidence of actual damage" to the market for or value
7
of the copyrighted work. 25 As such, the Court stated that the burden
shifted

to defendant to rebut this prima facie case of damage.
According to the Court, the defendant fai led to do so. 2 58 The last two
factors in the fair use analysis weighed very heavily against fair use,

perhaps so heavily that no showing on the other two factors could

save the defense. Thus, it is l ittle wonder that the Court dec lined to

effectuate the defendant' s proposed rul e or excepti on, which was to
allow free speech interests related to publishing information on public
figures to override the "traditional" doctrine of fair use, rather than

only to provide an interpretive guidepost. As put by the Court,

"Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for

j udicially

imposing, a 'compulsory license ' permitting unfettered access to the
5
unpublished copyrighted express i o n of public figures."2 9

3. Stewart v. Abend
The Court ' s third encounter with fa i r use, in Stewart

v.

260
A bend,

provided no reason to seriously consider free speech c oncerns within

the first fair use factor or any other element of the fair use analysis.

Abend owned by assignment the copyright in a short story, "It Had to
Be Murder," during the renewal term of copyright. 26 1 That story
formed the basis of the movie "Rear Window." As an alternative
argument to the primary issue of rights i n a derivative work fol lowing
expiration of a grant of rights to the pre-existing work, the distributo rs
of the mo vie "Rear Window" argued that use of the sho rt story in the
62 At the

movie during the renewal term was a noninfringing fair use. 2

256.

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67.

257.

Id. at 567.

258.

Id. at 567-69.

259.

id. at 569.

260.

Stewart v . Abend, 495 U.S. 207 ( 1 990).

26 1 .

id. at 2 1 2 .

?

62.
id. at 236. The fair use claim in this case would
certainl y not have been accepted for
.
review by the C�urt had it not been part of a case
present ing an important issue upon which the
circuits w r split: whether th e owner of copyri
ght i n a derivative work infringed
the rights in
.
the pre-ex1stmg work by d1stnbu
tmg the deriva tive work during the renewa
l term of copyright,

��
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Court of Appeals,
"educational"

the

rather

distributors

than

claimed

"commerc ial"

that

and

the

thus

use
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was

should

be

considered fair, particularly with respect to the fi rst fair use factor. 26 3

Without support in the record for that claim, and with all three of the
remaining factors weighing against a fi nding o f fair use, the assertion
of fair use failed miserably. Following its general explication of the
parameters of fair use, including repeti tion of i t s Sony statement about
the impact of a commercial usc,264 the Court devoted few words to its
analysis of fair use and easily dispensed w ith th e i ssue.
4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose M us i c , I n c.
In the most recent fair use decision by the Court, Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ,265 the defendants, members of the rap group 2
Live Crew, admitted to using some

of the

expression from the

plaintiffs work, "Oh, Pretty Woman," in creating their new work,
"Pretty Woman." The sole issue before the Supreme Court was fair
use. In overturning the district court's grant of s ummary judgment to
2 Live Crew finding fair use, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit emphasized the commercial nature of the use as w e i ghing
against two of the four fair use factors, c i ting the Sony decision on the

first fair use factor and Harper & Row on the fourth factor. 266 The

Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings after
resoundingly c l arifying Sony: according to the Court, Sony did not
call for a presumption against fair use i n a case o f commercial use.
Instead, Sony only included commerciality as one of many factors to
be weig hed in a fair use analysis: 267
The Court of Appea l s ' s elevation of one sentence from Sony to a

per se rule thus runs as much counter to Sony itself as to the long
common-law tradition of fair use adj udication. Rather, as we
explai ned in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the proposition that
the "fact that

a

publication

was

commercial as opposed

to

when the author and original assignor of rights to create the derivative work died before he was
able to convey rights in the renewal term of the pre-existing work.

263.

Id. at 2 3 7 .

264.

See id.

("The

�

s enume ated in §
motion picture neither falls into any o f the categorie

1 07 nor meets the four criteria set forth in § 1 07. ' [ E]very [unauthorized] commercial use of

?

�

hat
copyrighted material is presump tively an unfair exploitation of the mon poly pri vilege
_
,
Stud10s
City
al
Univers
v.
Am.
of
Corp.
belongs to the owner of the copyright."' (quoting Sony
lnc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 4 5 1 ( 1 984))).

265.

. 569 ( 1 994).
Campb ell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0 U . S

266.

Id. at 573- 74.

267.

id. at 584-85.
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against a findin g
nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
,, 68
.
of f:ai r use. 2

s a heavy burde n
While a findin g of comm ercial use sti l l create
k ne l l fo l l owing
for the defen dant to overcome, it is no longer a death
etatio n of its
interpr
the Court' s "correction" of l ower courts '
u n fair uses.
comment in Sony that commerci a l uses are presum pti vely
ciality
ommer
c
In Campbell, the Court was careful to note that while
create
does weigh against a fair use, it i s not d ispositive and docs not
9
6
And in Camphell, despite not
a presump tion i n a procedural sense. 2

question ing whether 2 Live Crew ' s musical work w a s a use of a
commerci a l nature, the Court d i d recognize that commcrc i a l i ty - if
made presumpti vely unfair and solely equated with pro fi t - would
swallow all of the often-fair purposes o f a use listed in sect ion I 07.
including comment, criticism, news reporting and the l i ke.no The
Campbell Court even quoted Samuel Johnson : "No man but a
7
blockhead ever wrote, except for money."2 1 So w h i l e the Court

acknowledged that making money is not really the issue in fair use, it
did not ultimately redirect the attention of courts away from using a
profit-nonprofit distinction within the first factor or otherwise reorient

the commercial use issue within purpose and character o f a use. The
commercial nature of a use w i t h i n the first factor is sti l l j udged
largely by the question of profit. 2 7 2
In Campbell the Court also emphas i zed that commcrc ial ity is not
the only relevant characteristic bearing upon "purpose and character
of the use." A ccording to the Court, the "transformative" nature of a
use has a significant role to play : the more transformative a use, the
less relevant other aspects of purpose and character o f the use,
7
including its commerciality.2 3 The Court construed the "purpose and
character" of the allegedly infringing use as implicating two elements
from Folsom : "the nature and obj ects o f the selections made" within
268. ld. at 585 (quoting Harper & Row, Publisher s, Inc. v. Nation
Enters .. 47 1 U . S 539
562 ( 1 985)).
.

.

Id. at 583-85.

269.

Id. at 584.

270.
27 1 .

Id. (�uotin g 3 BOSWE LL'S LIFE OF J OHNSO N
I 9 (G. Hill ed. 1 93 4 )).
272. In �icta, the Court did assert in Campbell
that the use of a work .. to advertise a
product, even m a parody, will be entitled to
less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use
enquiry than the sale of a parody for its
own sake, let alone one perfonncd a single
time by
.
students m school ." Id at 585 The C ou
rt th ere b Y a ti u d ed to a range of cornrnc rcial
ity. a range
that one m
fi tght compa re to commercial speech
doctri ne, but it did not actual ly set forth a�y
standard or a lower court to apply F
or d 1scuss1
.
on of some 1mplica t10ns of using a range of
commerc1ahty, see infra note 3 1 8.
·

·

.

·

·

.

273.

.

.

Campbell,

·

·

·

�

5 1 0 U.S. at 579, 584-8 5 .
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the allegedly infringing work and whether that work "supersede[s] the

objects" of the original work.27-1 According to the Court, the thrust of

the inquiry on the first factor is whether the al legedly infringing work

"adds something new, with a further purpose or di fferent character,

altering the first with new expression, meani ng, or message; it asks, in
other words, whether
.

"'275
'trans1ormat1ve.
�

and

to

what

extent

the new w o rk is
.
.
Th e C ourt states th at encouraging th e creation o f

transformative works, or at least al lowing the ir creation to potenti ally
survive an infringement claim, furthers "the goal of copyright, to

promote science and the arts. ,,;m, Because the Court thought the 2
Li ve Crew song could reasonably be perceived to contain a parodic

character, it reasonably could be classed as a transformative use :

"Like less ostensibly humorous fonns of c riticism, [parody] can
provide social benefit, by shedding li ght on an earlier work, and, i n

the process, creating a n e w one . "277

Campbell's assessment of transformative uses focuses upon the
value of those uses in pursuit of copyri ght ' s internal constitutional
goal. Campbell did not tie either transformative uses or copyright ' s
constitutional goal to the external question o f First Amendment
interests. At the same time, it did not state that only transformative
works can claim to further the internal goal o f copyright, and it did
not foreclose consideration of First Amendment interests within the

first fair use factor. By stating that transforrnative works "lie at the
heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright,"278 the Court did not prec lude the possibil ity

that other allegedly infringing works m i gh t also lie within fair use' s

"breathing space," or even at its heart.

5. Postscript: Eldred v. Ashcroft
Only one o f the Court's four fair use cases, Harper & Row,
deci ded in 1 985, included any discussion of the First Amendment.279
More recen tly, the Court explicitly tied free speech to fair use in

another copyright case, the Eldred decis ion of 2003 .280 Eldred did not
incl ude any substantive analysis of fair use; i t was not a fair use case.

274.
4 ,901 )).
27 5 .
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Mass. 1 84 1 ) (No.
Id. at 578-79 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.

Id. at 579 .

Id.

Id.

Id.

See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
See Eldred

v.

v.

Nation Enters.,

Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1 87, 22 1 (2003) .

47 1 U.S. 539, 560 ( 1 985).
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The

Court

relied on the

existence

of the

fair

use

doctrine in

responding to the plaintiff-petitioner ' s claim that the Copyright Tenn

Extens i o n Act of 1 998 should be s ubj ect to direct First Amendment
28 1
scrutiny.
The only authority c ited in Eldred for re ly ing on fair use

to dismiss the request for First Amendment scrutiny was 1-fwper &
282
Row,
and the Court did not further e xpand on i ts reaso n i ng.

C. Fair Use in the Lower Courts
W i th the insensitive fair use factors and no real free speech gloss

from the Supreme Court to guide them, it is no wonder that the lower

courts rare ly balance free speech interests with copyright interests
283
when applying the fair use defense.
The only real cons istency in the
as-yet- l imited judicial treatment of F i rst Amendment claims within
copyright' s fair use doctrine i s the courts' reliance upon the first

factor, the purpose and character of the use, as the pri mary factor
284
accommodating free speech-related concems.
Wh i l e this might be
appropriate in the abstract, at this time the approach is problematic as

a practi cal matter. As discussed above, the current language and

current interpretation of the first fa i r u s e factor do not l end themselves
to sensitive accommodation of F irst A mendment concerns.
Following Campbell, lower courts transitioned from the post1 976

v i ew

of

the

first

commercial/noncommercial

factor

as

question

(or

almost

exclusively

a

commercial/nonprofit

educational question) to a binary inquiry into both commerciality and

28 1 .
282.
283.

See id. at 2 1 8-22.

See id. at 2 1 9.

I n order to reach a consciously free-speech-sensitive result, it might be argued that

courts would be required to stretch the more standard concepts of fair use even while ostensibly
applying the doctrine in a faithful manner. See, e.g.

.

R osemont Enters .. Inc . v. Random House.

Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1 966); Time, Inc. v. B ernard Geis Assocs .. 293 F. Supp. 1 3 0

(S.D.N.Y. 1 968). See also Nimmer, supra note 6 (supporting the absence of First Amendment

considerations within fair use but arguing for limited First Amendment considerations within
copyright doctrine as a whole).
284.

See, e.g., Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303; Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. 1 3 0 . See also Suntrust

Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d

1 257, 1 264 ( 1 1 th Cir. 200 I ) (considering the
intersection of copyright and free speech before applying the four fair use factors and focusing
up�n transformation and market harm when concluding that the defendant would l ikely succeed

its fair use defense); Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d I 044,
1 049 (2d Cir. 1 983); Harper & Row, Publ ishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters .. 723 F . 2d 1 95, 206-08
(2d Cir. 1 98 3 ) (focusing upon the news reporting purpose of the use), rev 'd, 47 U.S. 3
1
5 9
( 1 985). Cf Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 5 3 9 (discussing the defendan t '
s asserted First
Amendment "public figure" defense in the context of the first and second factors
but ultimately
m

denying the defense). See also Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 1 99,
at 6 8 5 (arguing that in
.
appropnate circumstances, courts may consider the F i rst Amendmen
t within purpose and
character of the use, citing as authority both Rosemont a n d
Bernard Geis).
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285

While some courts have smce 1 976 expressly
considered other elements within "purpose and character of the
.
,,2s6
use,
many or even most current l y anal yze only commercial use

transfonnation.

and trans fo nn at i ve

use.287

Neither sub-factor prompts courts to

consider the First Amendment in any depth.
In connection with this article, I performed a comprehensive
survey of all district and appellate court deci sions that include any
discussion of the meaning of commercial use within section 1 07 .
There are more than 200 such cases, yet they contain very little
judicial analysis of the meaning or relevance of commercial use. The

285.

Unfortunately, some decisions still focus upon commercial use alone, even after the

Coun's statement in Camphell that commercial use does not c reate a presumption against fair
use. See, e.g., Lamb

v.

Starks

,

949 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1 996); !tar-Tass Russian N ews

Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1 1 20 ( S . D . N . Y . 1 995); Robinson v. Random
House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1 995).

286.

Courts that include considerations other than commercial and transformative use

within the first factor, purpose and character of a use, most o ften look at bad faith. See, e.g.,
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F . 3 d 244, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2006) (failing to seek permission for a use is
not in itself evidence of bad faith); NXIVM Corp v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 47 1 , 478 (2d Cir.
.

2004) (breaching a confidentiality agreement in connection with the alleged infringement is
evidence of bad faith); Nunez v. Caribbean Int') N ews Corp., 235 F.3d I 8, 22 (I st Cir. 2000)
(consi dering good faith as well as commercial use and transformation of the original works into
news, i.e. , the original photographs themselves were part of th e controversy being covered by
the news story in which the photographs were reproduced); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 30 1 , 309
(2d Cir. 1992) (removing the copyright symbol from the original work is evidence of bad faith);
Weissm an v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1 3 1 3, 1 324 (2d Cir. 1 989) (deleting plaintiff author's name and
substituting defendant's name damages the defendant's ability to utilize the equitable defense of
fair use); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1 1 48, 1 1 53 (9th Cir. 1 986)
(copying the copyrighted work i n order to respond to and comment upon a personal attack made
in that copyri ghted work weighs i n favor of defendant within purpose and character of a use);

Harper & Row, 47 1 U . S. at 562 (copying from a purloined manuscript indicates bad faith). See
also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1 1 7 1 , 1 1 75-76 (9th Cir. 1 983) (finding impropriety i n
defendant's conduct because defendant had not sought permission and had copied the original

work without providing credit to the original source).

287. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F . 3 d 1 9 1 , 1 98200 (3rd Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800-03 (9th Cir.
2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F . 3 d 1 25 7 , 1 269 (I I th Cir. 200 1 ); Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 1 50 F.3d 104, 1 07-09 (2d Cir. 1 998); Los Angeles News Serv. v.

Reuters Televi sion Int' I, Ltd., 1 49 F.3d 987, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1 998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v .
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1 09 F . 3 d 1 394, 1401 (9th C i r . 1 997); Toho Co. v. W i l l iam Morrow
and Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1 206, 1 2 1 6- 1 7 (C.D. Cal. 1 998); Storm I mpact. Inc. v. Software of the

�

�

Month Club, 1 3 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787-88 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (utilizing only transf rma 1ve and
profit/non-profit use in its analysis despite characteriz ing the purpose and character mqmry as an
examinati on of "whether the particular use made of copyrighted material was necessary to the
_
assened purpose" and "whether the defendant reproduced the copyright owner's express on f r
the purpose of marketing the precise form of that expression or for the purpose of making his
own addi tional statement ."). But see Blanch, 4 67 F . 3 d at 2 5 1 -56 (considering the elements of
transformation, commerc ial use, and bad faith, as well as a fourth category of parody, satire and
justification for the copying).

�

�
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decisions focus primarily on a defendant's pursuit of commercial
288
Some decisions broaden the category even further,
gain, or profit.
holding that, for example, a u s e can be for profit, and thus disfavored,
even i n the largely unremunerative world of academ ia, because
defendant can

a

benefit personally or professionally from copying
289
The vast majority of lower

despite the l ack of a monetary gain.

court decis ions on the first factor do not indicate that courts attempt to
consider the overall relevance of c ommercial use to the fair use
�90
inquiry or any variability withi n the c ategory of commercial uses.
When a use i s for a commercial p u rpose, the courts weigh that fact
against fair u s e (after Campbell, this weight is l ighter w hen the use is

288.

The cases after Campbell do provide a more nuanced analysis than prior cases. but

the majority of the newer cases still consider the distinction a dichotomous one - commercial

or

noncommercial use - with nothing in between. The effect of Campbell is largely in the weight
placed upon a finding of commercial use i n cases where the use was also transformativc.
289.

See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F . 2 d 1 3 1 3 , 1 3 24 (2d Cir. 1 989).

290.

See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F . 3 d at 1 98-200 (limiting discussion o f commercial

in the first factor to the finding that the use was commercial because the defendant charged

a

use

fee

for its service); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803 (finding that the defendant artist engaged in

a

commercial use because he "had a commercial expectation and presumably hoped to find

a

market for his art," but also determining that the transformative nature of the use outweighed its
commerc ial purpose); Suntrust Bank, 268 F . 3 d at 1 269 (characterizing the a l l egedly in fringing
work as "undoubtedly a commercial product" because it was published for profit, without any
further analysis of commerciality, despite the

fact

that the work criticized the original.

particularly the race relations depicted therein); Los A ngeles News Serv. , 1 49 F .3d at 994 (not
distinguishing

between

commercial

news

reportin g

and

other

commercial

purposes

in

considering the first fair use factor); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. M P3 .com, I n c . , 92 F. Supp. 2d
349, 35 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (characterizing d e fendant's use as highly commercial, although it was
a free service, because defendant sought to make a profit by other means); Toho Cu., 33 F.
Supp. 2d at 1 2 1 7 (concluding without analysis that a book was a "purely com mercial use"). But
see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254:
It can hardly be said . . . that the defendants' economic gains from (the
accused

work)

were

'to

the

exclusion

of

broader

public

benefits.""

Notwithstanding the fact that artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes
earn money, the public exhibition of art is widely and we think properly
considered to "have value that benefits the broader public interest."
(citations omitted); Nunez, 235 F.3d at 22:
For a commercial use to weigh heavily against a finding of fair use, it must
involve more than simply publication i n a profit-making venture. . . . We
agree . . . that the commercial use here, however, constitutes more than
mere

reproduction for a profitable use. The photographs were used in part to
create an
enticing lead page that would prompt readers to purchase the newspaper.
Thus El
Vocero used the photograph not only as an ordinary part of
a profit-mak ing
venture, but with emphasis in an attempt to increase its revenue.

See also Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp.
2d 70 1 , 705 (E.D. Mich. 1 998)
(noting that "[t)he fact that a charge is made for a work, or that
a profit is anticipated . . . does
.
not convert the use mto a commercial one . . . . 'The c ommercia
l nature of a use is a matter of
degree, not an absolute . . . . "' (quoting Maxtone -Graham
v. Burtchaell ' 803 F .2 d 1 253 ' 1 262
(2d Cir. 1 986)).
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also transformative), and then the courts move on without further
291
discussion.
Since Campbell, most courts have begun to analyze uses for the
presence or absence of a transformative character. They seem most
comfortable with finding a transformative, and thus a fair-use
favorable, use when the use is also negatively critical of the original
292
work.
The courts do not, by and l arge, inquire as to the relationship
of the specific use in question to either copyright interests or F i rst
293
Amendment interests.
If any rationale is provided for the court's

29 1 .

See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 1 9 8-200; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1 269;

Castle Rock Entm 't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 1 50 F . 3 d 1 3 2, 1 4 1 -42 (2d Cir. 1 998); Los
Angeles News Serv. , 1 49 F.3d at 994; Dr. Seuss, 1 09 F.3d at 1 40 1 . But see Blanch, 467 F.3d at

253-54 (explaining that because transformative works are less l i kely to be market substitutes for
the original work, the commercialism of a transformative use i s less significant to the fair use
analysis); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803 (the commercialism of a transformative use is less significant
to the fair use analysis).
292.

See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1 270 (emphasizing, throughout the discussion of

transfonnation, the fact that the new work criticized the original work: "(The new work] is more
than an abstract, pure fictional work. It is principally and purposefully a critical statement that
seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology of [the original]."); Dr.
Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1 400-01 (considering only parody targeting the original work, and not satire,

to be the type of transformative work favoring fair use). But see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 8 1 1 , 8 1 9 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a transformat ive use where the allegedly infringing use
served a different function and purpose than the original work).
293.

In reviewing recent case law, I found but a few examples of courts going beyond the

details of the fair use "test" to include consideration of the relationship of the specific use to the
broader purposes of copyright. Most courts simply walked mechanically through the fair use
factors. Decisions in which courts did go beyond the details of the fair use factors to include
broader interests generally did so by referring to the "public interest" underlying copyright law.
See. e.g., Perfect 1 0, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 70 1 , 722 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing

purpose and character of a use with reference to the purposes of copyright, noting that the
Supreme Court "has directed us to be mindful of the extent to which a use promotes the
purposes of copyright and serves the interest of the public"); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254:
It can hardly be said .

.

. that the defendants' economic gains from [the accused

work] were "to the exclusion of broader public benefits."

Notwithstanding the

fact that artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes earn money, the
public exhibition of art i s widely and we think properly considered to "have value
that benefits the broader public interest."
(citations omitted). See also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (considering, within purpose and character of
the use, the court's j udgment that the use of the copyright owner's work "promotes the goals of

the Copyright Act and the fair use exception. The (use does] not stifle artistic creativity
because . . . [it does] not supplant the need for the originals. In addition, [the use) benefit[s] t e
pub lic by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the i nternet."); Castle Rock Entm t,
1 50 FJd at 1 4 1 (tying fair use analysis to the Copyright Clause but not to the First Ame dment:
"The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright law's goal of 'promot[mg] the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,' U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, c l . 8, 'would be better served by
allowing the use than by preventing it. "' (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1 06 ,
_
1 077 (2d Cir. 1 992)). I found only one case that explicitl y utilized the First Amendm ent m
ruli ng/or an infringement defendant on the issue of fair use. See infra note 295.

�

�
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only a

repetiti n o f language from Campbell. 294 While exceptions t
this
�
general pattern exist, only one recent fair use decision has credited a
defendant's assertion of First A mendment rights and has been based
on a balanc i n g o f the public benefits or interests promoted by the

varied purposes of copyright and the First Amendment. 2 95

V. REINTERPRETING AND REVISING FAIR USE TO B ETTER PROTECT
FREE SPEECH
The language of the fair use statute provides little guidance for.
and also little express restraint on, a court ' s application of fair use to
vindicate or deny relief to an asserted free speech interest. The 1 i stcd

See, e.g. , Suntrust Bank, 268 F .3d at 1 269-7 1 .

294.

295.
See id. at 1 257. In Suntrust, the Eleventh Circuit included First Amen<lmcnt
considerations in its analysis of a preliminary injunction that had been granted to restrain
publication of a novel al leged to infringe on the copyright in Margaret M itche l l ' s hook Cione
with the Wind. Id. at 1 265. The novel was defended as a parody that criticized Gone with 1he
Wind, particularly the race relations depicted therein. Id. at 1 2 70. The primary lin k noted hy the
court between fair use and the First Amendment was the fact that some criticism and comment
can be protected via fair use. Id. at 1 265 ("[T)he narrower quest ion in this case is to what extent
a critic may use the protected elements of an original work of authorship to communicate her
criticism without infringing the copyright in that work. . . . (T]his becomes essentially an
analysis of the fair use factors."). But while Suntrust has been hailed as a case giving more
positive attention to First Amendment interests than any other recent copyright case. the court
did little to advance critical analysis of the relationship of fair use to free speech. The court
limited its analysis of speech interests to the idea-expression dichotomy and the fa i r use defense.
Id. at 1 264-65. It also made the unsupported, broad assertion that "First Amendment privi leges
are [ ) preserved through the doctrine of fair use. Until codification of the fair-use doctrine in the
1 976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right developed to preserve the constitutionaliti· ol
copyright legislation by protecting First A mendment values." Id. at 1 264 (emphasis ad d ed ) .
Given current appli cation of the fair use factors (detailed in other portions of this article). by
continuing to rely on fair use as it currently exists, these statements hurt rather than help future
defendants' attempts to use fair use to vindicate speech interests. And in the end. the court" s
dec ision to vacate the preliminary injunction d i d not arise from an expressly speech-sensitive
application of fair use. Instead, its decision was based on the court's balancing o f the irreparable
harm an public interest factors within analysis of the propriety of a prelimi nary injunction. as
well as its assessment that the fair use defense was viable under Camphell's treatment of
parodies.
In this case, we have found that to the extent Suntrust suffers injury from [the
parodic novel's) putative infringement of its copyright in (Gone with
the Wind].
such harm can adequately be remedied through an award of monetary
damages .
Moreover, under the present state of the record, it appears that
a viable fair use
defense i s available . Thus, the issuance o f the injunction was
at odds with the
share principle s of the First Amendm ent and the copyright
law, acting a s a prior
rest�amt on s �eech because the public had not had access
to (defend ant's) ideas
or v1ewpo mt m the form of expression that she chose.
Id. at 1 277.

�

�
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factors are non-exclusivc,296 despite a j udicial history since 1 976
indicating otherwise. As such, a court could c hoose to consider First
Amendment values outside of the listed factors. But there is also room
for the First Amendment within the standard four factors. Sligh t
adjustments to the courts ' approach t o the factors would be needed, t o
be sure, but those adj ustments do not pose a n insurmountab le hurdle.
The plain language of section I 07 tells us that the purpose and
character of a use is much wider than considerations of commercial
nature and nonprofit educational purposes - and not j ust because
those considerations arc part of a dependent " including" clause that
could "swallow" the i l l ustrative uses a l s o provided in section I 07 2 97
.

The commercial nature of a use cannot be interpreted as the opposite
of a nonprofit educational purpose,

as the

two are simply not

opposites. Moreover, as set forth in Part 1 1 1 . D . above, the legislative
history of the "commercial" use language is virtually non-existent,
indicating only that it was added to placate the education lobby rather
than to vindicate a significant policy interest. 298 Analysis of the
purpose and character of a use should not b e constrained by the
additional language related to the commercial nature of a use.
And while the Court in Campbell moved lower courts away from
a myopic view of the purpose and character of a use as being a simple
question of profit motive, its emphasis on "transformative" use has
introduced another form of myopia that threatens the viability of fair
use as a protector of free speech. A broader v ision of the purpose and
character of a use,

one which respects Campbell but treats

its

emphasis on transformative use as only one facet of the inquiry,
would do much to invigorate fair use w i t h free speech sensitivity.
A. Expanding Purpose and Character Beyond "Transformative "
Uses

The Supreme Court's guidance i n C ampbell has created its own
potential confl i c t between the First Amendment and fair use. With the
current emphasis on transformative uses, allegations of fair use via
reproduction, rather than transformation, immediately lose the first
element of the fair use battle, regardle s s of the contribution of those
reproductions to public discourse or other beneficial purpose. As
Rebecca

Tushnet

recently

argued,

free

speech values

may

be

promoted via reproduction of works j ust as those values may be

296.
297.
298.

17

U.S.C.

§ I 07 (2000).

See supra note 24 for the full text of section

See sup ra Part I l l . D .

1 07. See also supra Part IV.B.4 .
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9
advanced via transformation o f works. 2 9 She discusses the value o f
copying

and

dissemination t o

audiences,

an

acc c s� and public
.
_
discourse value, as well the value to speakers, mcludmg values of

self-expression, persuasion, and affirmation, all of which fa ll within
the self-realization interest promoted
speech.

through protection

of core

None of those values inheres only in transformati on or

original speech. Even Melville N immer, the ultimate progen itor of the
Court's assertion that copyrig ht ' s internal safeguards prevent a clash
with free speech, 300 clearly articulated the important point that free
speech need not be original i n order t o be protected.30 1 The Court
itself implicitly recognized thi s issue in Cohen

v.

Ca/ijiJrnia when it

protected the relatively inarticulate, and likely unorig i nal, statement
3
on Cohen's jacket. 02
Although in Campbell the Court emphasized the value of a
transfonnative use in supporting c opyright's internal purpose of
promoting science and the arts, it did not foreclose the breadth of the
"breathing space" guaranteed within fair use. 3 03 Nor did the Court say
that the transformative nature o f a use was the ultimate question under

the first factor. Rather, the Court high l ighted transforrnative uses as a

category potentially invested with a p ub l ic benefit.

If the emphasis on "transformative" uses in Campbell is viewed

as a proxy for a wider public interest i nquiry, rather than a category to
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and

299.

How Copying Serves It, 1 14 YALE L. J. 535, 562-82 (2004); Yolokh, supra note 6. at 725-27.

See also Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use
Doctrine, 5 8 ALB. L. REV. 677, 7 1 3 ( 1 995) ("The productive use doctrine, by discounting the
benefits of access, and refusing to weigh them along with the benefits of creation, unnecessarily
narrows the focus of inquiry under the first factor of section

See Netanel, supra note 6, at 7- 1 2 .

300.

I OT').

See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 685-86 (Leonard w.
30 1 .
Levy et al. eds., 1 986) (including an entry on copyright, written by Mel Nimmer. wherein
Nimmer agreed that there was a conflict between the First Amendment and the copyright
laws,
due m part to the fact that "(n]othing in the First A mendment limits the freedom protected

�

�

t ereun er to speec

�

that is original with the speaker," but wherein he also pointed to the
d1stmct1on between ideas and expression within copyright as the means by
w h i c h the conflict is
resolved, claiming tha "' ideas' lie in the domain of the First Amendmen
t, so that copyright may
�
not be claimed therem, but that the form of 'expressio n' of ideas
may be the subject of
copyright, notwithstanding the First Amendmen t.").

302
See Cohen v. California, 403 U . S . 1 5 ( 1 9 7 1 ). Similarly , when
the N. Y. Times wished
:
.
to reprint portions o the "Pentagon Papers," the fact that the
works
were
not original to the
.
Times did not factor mto the Co rt's decision on First Amendm
ent grounds , and neither did the
�
fact that the author of those written works (the governm
ent) objected to their publicat ion. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3 (
1 97 1 ) . Accord Tushnet, supra note 299. at 563 64; McJohn, supra note 8 1 , at 1 09.

�

303.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 5 1 0 U
. S . 569, 579 ( 1 994). See
accompanying notes 276-278.

s upra

text
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be pursued for its own sake, the broadening o f the first factor would
create a window through which fair use could truly protect free
speech. The

Eldred opinion instructs courts to construe copyright ' s

internal safeguards to accommodate F i rst Amend ment concems.

304

A

broader interpretation o f Camphel/ that looks at "transformation" as
an example of a public benefit, not a stand-alone inquiry, would help
courts do just that.
Public benefit via speech creatio n and dissemination spans a
broader reach than transformative uses only. Mere reproduction and
dissemination can create public bene fit not otherwise created by the
original work, such as in the case of (future Senator) Allan Cranston' s
preparation and distribution of a translation o f Adolf Hitler' s Mein

Kampf Cransto n ' s purpose - certainly

beneficial to the pub l i c - was

to combat the effect of the selectively

edited, and m i sleading,

translation officially available in the United States through Hitler ' s
305
Cranston lost the copyright infringement case brought by
publisher.
Hitler' s publisher in 1 9 3 9 . 306 Under the fair use analysis app lied by
many courts today, he would likely lose aga i n because his use would
be

classified

transformative.

as

both

commercial

A better analysis

is

and,

more

warranted.

damning,
Were

a

non

similar

situation to arise today, someone in Cransto n ' s position would have
no confidence that the F i rst Amendment would even be considered in
conn ection with a defense to copyright infringement.
If my argument is accepted and Campbell 's "transformati ve" use
is read as a proxy for a broader vision o f uses imbued with public
benefit, which would allow fair use to perform a First Amendment
purpose, the result would likely be different. The first factor of
purpose and character would favor Cranston, even though the use was
a reproduction rather than a transformation . The public benefit

provided by an accurate translation o f portions of Hitler's book that
were edited from the A merican edition, specifically portions related to
Hitler's plan for the world, would fulfill the First Amendmen t

purpose of dissemin ation of informat ion and expressio n that can assist

304.
See Eldred v . Ashcroft, 537 U.S. t 87, 22 1 n.24 (2003) ("[l]t is appropriate to construe
copyright's internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendme nt concerns."). The court cit d
.
,
as authority United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. , 5 1 3 U.S. 64, 78 ( 1 994), where 1t stated: It
long
so
doubts
onal]
is . . . incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate [serious constituti

:

as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. "
f'; Cranston Tells
305.
See Anthony o. M i ller, Court Halted Dime Edition of 'Mein Kamp
How Hitler Sued Him and Won, L.A . TIMES, Feb. 1 4 , 1 98 8 , at 4 .
28 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N .Y.
306.
See Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ'g Co., Inc.,
1939).
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the public in its evaluation of governmental policy. A n d a s I ar ue
�
below, the commercial sale of the translation should not factor mto
purpose and character of the use, a n d should instead be reserved for
the fourth factor.
The second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, would li kely
favor the publisher. The third factor, amount and substantiality of the
portion used, might still favor infringement rather than fair use, since
the copying would be both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial.
On the other hand, a court' s consideration of the public interest in
dissemination

of Hitler's actual

p l ans

for European

and

world

domination, including the powerful e ffect of hearing about those
plans in h i s own words, would h e l p mitigate any damage this factor
would do to Cranston's fair use defense, since significant c opying
would be necessary to accomp l i sh the valuable purpose of the use.
The fourth factor, market effects, m ight stil l favor the publisher. But
given that Cranston's translation focused on the aggressive, power
hungry side of Hitler's vision for the world as expressed in Mein
Kampf, which was missing from t h e o fficial version available from

Hitler's publisher, analysis of the l ik e l y effect on the market for the
official version might have instead resulted in the fourth factor's
being neutral , or at least only slightly damaging to Cran ston.307 And
even though Cranston's book was s o l d rather than given away, the
fourth factor might still be neutral b e c ause Cranston' s trans l ation was
not a real substitute for the official v ersion.
Altogether, consideration of a broad public interest in the first
factor, including speech interests, would give Cranston a fighting
chance of succeeding in his fair u s e defense. But if the first factor
remains limited to transformative uses and commercial purposes,
speech interests such as those rais e d in the Cranston Mein Kampf
-

situation are unlikely to be considered within fair use.
B. Eliminating Commerciality fro m the Purpose and Character
Inquiry

The continued emphasis o n commercial use withi n a doctrine
ostensibly sensitive to free speech concerns means that the courts'

�

defi n tion of c ommercial use reta i n s vital importance. I n its fair use
.
dec1s1ons, the Supreme Court's guidance has been l imited. I n both
Sony and Harper & Row, commerci a l use was characterized as being

307.

See Miller, supra note 305.
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opposed to non-profit use. 3

08

99

In Harper & Row the Court went even

further, stating that benefiting from c o pyrighted material "without
09
paying the customary price" meant a commercial use. 3
That
definition could

easily

include

noncommerc ial,

nonprofit

uses.

Moreover, the reasoning is circular: if the use i s fair, then there i s no
infringement and no need for authorization or a fee - there is no
customary price for a fair use. Even Campbell, which criticized the
appellate court ' s analysis of commercial use, did little to refine the

analysis.3 1 0

This leaves the commercial use inquiry in the first factor directly
in conflict with the Court's First Amendment instruction as to the
appropriate categorization of speech when preparing to apply greater
or lesser protection to types of speech . As outl ined in Part I I . 8 . 2
above, speech does not lose core First Amendment protection d u e t o a

profit motive or other commercial connection, such as paid
plac eme nt. 31 1 The lower protection afforded t o commerci a l speech
arises only when the speech does no more than propose a commercial

transacti on or evinces a thoroughly commercial character through an
aggregati on of elements, including format, content, and purpose. 3 1 2

By disfavoring commerc ial uses on the basis o f a profit motive or

other economic

purpose,

current fai r use

analysis

discriminates

against core speech simply because the speaker disseminated the
speech for the speaker' s own benefit.
In addition to the categorical clash above, as well as the conflict
of the profit-nonprofit analysis with many of the "more fair" types of
uses such as criticism and reporting, the c o ntinued emphasis on
commercial or profit-based uses duplicates the concern of the fourth
factor, market effects. When a use is deemed to be of a commercial

nature due to its fai lure to pay a license fee 3 1 3 or its presence in a

commercial market in competition with the original work, those

considerations really do not address "purpose and character." Instead,
they address the market for or value of the copyrighted work. When a

use is commercial because it affects copyright' s utilitarian, incentive
based structure, the use implicates the copyright owner's interest i n
the market fo r o r value of the work. T h e fourth factor i s exp l i c itly
( 1 984) ; Harper
308.
Sony Corp. o f Am. v. Universal City Studios, I n c . , 464 U . S . 4 1 7, 449
& Row, Publis hers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (J 985) .
309.
3 1 0.

Harper & Row, 47 1 U . S . at 562.
See supra notes 267-272 and accompan ying text.

3 1 1.

See supra Part 11.B.2.

3 1 2.

Id.

3 1 3.

See Harp er & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 562.

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGf-1 TECH . L.J.

1 00

[Vol. 24

concerned w i th the effec t of the use o n the market for, an d value o C
314
the plaintiff's work.
Market effects should not be d ou ble-c ounted
through the first factor. An d when courts do consider " commercial
nature" so broadly in the first factor as to engulf all for-profit
enterprise, the commercial nature of a use bears a heavy burden on a
�15
defen dant i n two of the four factors. This skews a c ourt ' s an alysis.·
As an example, consider Harper & Row. The c as e might come
out

the

s ame

way

even

after

eliminating

the

c ommcrc ial

nonc ommercial use distinction. But the First Amen dment i nterest in
news reportin g an d information d i s s emin ation would have received
more attentio n if The Nation ' s profi t-oriented status had n ot been used
as on e "strike" against fair use, w i th the derivative mark et c ounted as
316
an additional "strike."
The First Amendment in terest c ou l d have
been

consi dered

head-on

if

the

article's

clear

n ews-reporting,

noncommercial speech status had been accounted for an d

if the

article's profit-making status had not been turned against i t. I d o not
argue that the result in this particular case would n ecessarily have
317
been different un der my propos e d analysis.
That res u lt wou l d
simply have been more defe ns i bl e wi thin a balancing

o f Firs t

A men dment and copyri ght in ter ests. Just as not all n ews reporting
escapes libel law, not all news reporti n g wi ll escape c o pyri ght law.
We should, however, remain sensitive t o the First A m en dment in each
analysis.
To further revise an d apply the fair use doctrin e today to
improve the protection of freedom of s peech in coordin ati o n with fair

3 1 4.

1 7 U .S.C. § 1 07(4) (2000) ("the effect o f the use upon the potential market for or

value of the copyrighted work").

See William W. Fisher Ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 1 0 1 HARV. L. REV.
3 15.
1659, 1 672-7 3 ( 1 988) (referring to this phenomenon a s "double-counting"); see also Jay Dratler,
Jr., Distilling the Witches ' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 2 3 3 . 302

( 1988) ("Allowing market considerations to dominate the ' purpose' factor, as well as the critical
'market effect' factor might give them more weight than Congress actually intended."). Laura
Lape argue that even after the ourt refocused attention in the first fair use factor, emphasizing
transformat1ve uses, the balance 1s stil l skewed:

�

�

:

[t]o fae
xtent that productive use i s equated with non-supers eding use,
cons1de atton of productive use under the first factor permits
the fourth factor,
market impact, to be counted twice . . . . This i s the case
because a supersed ing
use - a use that replaces the copyrigh ted work in the marketpla
ce - i s precisely
what satisfies the fourth factor.

�

Lape, supra note 299, at 7 1 5 .
3 1 6.

See Harper & Row, 47 1 U.S. at 566-67.

317.

The effect o n the market for serializa tion rights
o f Ford ' s memoir was l i kely s o great
'
the use of the "heart" o f the work might have been
so significant, and the fact that the
.
.
publication was p u osely timed to scoop the previou
sly unpublished work and article might
.
have been so UnJusttfied - that all might have
coalesc ed to reach the same result.
·

'."Jl
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use's role in carrying out the constitutional

101

aim of copyright,

Congress should eliminate the commerciality of a use from the
purpose and character inquiry. Specifically, Congress should delete
from the first fair use factor the express inclusion of "whether such
use is of a commercial

nature or

is

for

nonprofit educational

purposes." The language, as applied by the courts, skews the fair use

analysis away from the more core questions of public benefit and true
market harm to the plaintiff.

3 1 8.

Even without Congressional

m

action,

Moreover, it is not consistently

the

Court

could choose to redefine

the

"commercial" nature of a use within the first factor to create the other end of the spectrum from
"nonprofit educational" use. This would move lower courts further in the direction begun by
Campbell by making the commerciality of a use an even less influential factor in most cases.

Accord Tushnet, supra note 6, at 70-74. By creating a spectrum of uses, the Court would
eliminate the illogical contraposition of commercial uses with non-profit educational uses. See

supra text accompanying notes 297-298. For example, photocopying a musical work in order
that an entire school choir may sing it at a free performance is noncommercial and educational,
and yet that use might completely supplant a significant market for the work, particularly if the
work has been prepared with special emphasis on the youth choral market.
I would not suggest redrawing the line in the first factor at commercial speech (rather
than commercial use) because I think the "hardy" nature of commercial speech justifies the
distinction. See supra note 66. Cf Tushnet, supra note 6, at 70-74. I would suggest placing
commercial speech at one end of the spectrum in pursuit of another goal - to redirect courts
away from overly-harsh conclusions on the basis of commercial, profit-oriented purposes for the
second user' s expression/speech. My goal would simply be to introduce a more comprehensive
balance of interests by introducing First Amendment principles. Within fair use, a balancing of
various factors is already manifest - introducing a spectrum of commerciality would simply add
to the mix without discounting the First Amendment's careful protection of all kinds of uses,
including commerci al ones. Placing commercial speech at one end of the spectrum could be

appealing to the judiciary in light of the Court's prior determination that some subordination of
commercial speech is acceptable even within a wholly First-Amendment focused analysis. And

creating a spectrum, versus the current false dichotomy, more appropriately focuses the courts
on the wider range of interests implicated by the first factor, the purpose and character of a use.

But if we pay attention to the rationale behind commercial speech doctrine, on the
other hand, a difficulty with this proposal could arise. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
5 1 7 U.S. 484, 504 ( 1 996) (plurality opinion) (stating that speech prohibitions "serv[ing] an end

unrelated consumer protection . . . . rarely survive constitutional review"); City of C incinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 4 1 0, 424 ( 1 993) (invalidating a ban on commercial
newsracks when noncommercial newsracks were permitted, because the "categorical ban on

commercial newsracks place[s] too much importance on the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech [and because] in this case, the distinction bears no relat10nship
whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissibl e
means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate interests."); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 43 1 U.S. 85, 96 ( 1 977) (allowing the government less leeway m
regulating commercial speech when its restrictions do not take aim at the "commerci al aspect o f
[the speech] - with offerors communicating offers t o offerees."). Without evidence that uses m
"commercial speech" are more harmful to the copyright owner, i.e., less fair, than uses m
noncommercial speech (includin g noncommercial speech distributed for a profit), and without a
tie to the transactional aspect to commerc ial speech, the use of a commercial speech d1stmct1on
within fair use could be invalid. It is difficult to argue that use of a copynghted work m
adverti sing material is general l y (categorically, without analysi s of the particular use) more
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applied. If the explicit commerci al/nonprofit element o f the fi rst
factor were elimin ated, courts could then fee l freer to focus on other
elements of the purpose and character of a use and leave pro fiteering
(via profit usurpation) for the fourth factor. 3 1 9
The fair use analysis grew

from case law dea l i n g

al most

exclusively with defendants who h a d made commerc ial use o f the
work, and the addition of the language related to com merc ial use
appears to have been a last-minute p a l liative for the educational
lobby. As such, its i nclusion should never have been given signi ficant
emphasis by the courts. The courts' fai lure to engage in a real
evaluation o f the meaning of commerc i al ity and its re levance to the
purpose and c haracter of a use disserves the individual, case-by-case
balancing of i nterests that courts performed before the 1 976 A c t and
that

Congress

comparing

i ntended to

the

commercial

continue

after

speech/core

the

Act.

speech

line

M oreover,
in

First

Amendment j urisprudence with the c o mmercial use/noncommercial
use line in copyright fair use demonstrates a divergence with i n fair
use

from

F irst

Amendment

pri n ciples.

Such

a

div e rgence

unacceptabl e i n l i ght of the Court ' s e mphasis on fair use

is

as a

protector of free speech interests. Eliminating commercial ity from the
first fair use factor w i l l help minimize the conflict between the fair
use analysis and First Amendment j urisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court relies on fair use as one of the pri mary internal
safeguards for the freedom of speech within copyright, al though it has

hannful to protected interests of a copyright owner than the use of that same work in a book.
movie, educational text, etc. So although the distinction itself would not be controversial , in that
it mirrors an accepted distinction within First Amendment jurisprudence, there is weak. i f not
nonexistent, theoretical support for discriminating within fair use on the basis that a use occurs
in commerc ial speech. As such, the Court's statement in Campbell that "[t]he use, for example.
_
?f a copynghted
work to advertise a product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less
mdu ence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry than the sale of a parody for its own
sake also seems suspect, at best, under the Court's own commercial speech jurisprudence.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0 U . S . 569, 585 ( 1 994). Accord Tushnet, supra note 6,
at 70-74.

��

319 . I prefer eli mination of the first-factor consideration of commercial use over
. .
redefinition
of commercial use as commercial speech for multiple reasons. Some of those
reasons rela�e to the mo em treatment of commercial speech, see supra note 318, and others
relate to the mtemal considerations within fair use. Avoiding the skewing of the fair use analysis
by weighing profitable uses in both the first and fourth fair use factors would create a more
n�anced analysis of fair use. See supra text accompanying notes 31 3-3 15. In addition, the
. _
ehmmal!on
of con:mercial use from the first factor would bring current doctrine closer to the
broad, open balancmg accommodated in the pre- l 976 model of fair use.

�
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not explained its reliance. There is no evidence o f a First Amendment
purpose or structure to the doctrine, and l i ttle case law supports the

Court's position. Courts rarely consider fair use defenses i nvested
with significant free speech

interests.

G i ven

the direct

conflict

between copyright and the First Amendment and the strong publ i c
benefit underly ing each, w e cannot com pletely resolve the di fficulty

presented by such cases. No accommodation to copyright fair u s e can
be certain to always rescue a free speech interest from a c l aim of
copyright infringement. The Court could admit the lack of a real
connection between fair use and free speech and provide s e parate
First Amendment review in appropriate cases. Or,

if the

Court

continues to rely on fair use as a bulwark against separate F irst
Amendment scrutiny of copyright, then the Court and Congress owe a
duty to the First Amendment to make fair u s e and its analytical
frame work operate in accord with First Amendment principles rather
than in discord. If we do not provide separate First Amendment
review or reform fa ir use to encourage courts to consider a broad
range of public benefits and private purposes within the balan c e of the
first factor, we w i l l do a great disservi c e to the Constitution and future
litiga nts.

